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ARTICLES 
 
Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual 
Property Taxation* 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen† and Jeffrey A. Maine‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property assets are integral to U.S. 
businesses.1 Companies, large and small, expend substantial 
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 1 Consider, for example, Intellectual Ventures, a $5 billion startup company 
founded in 2000, which has a patent portfolio of 27,000 patents. See Nigel Page, IV 
Shifts Gears, 36 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 8, 9, 10 (2009), http://www.intellectualventures. 
com/Libraries/Article_Reprints/IAM_IV_story_July_-_Aug_2009.sflb.ashx (reporting 
the strategies of acquiring and creating inventions by Intellectual Ventures in the 
United States and five Asian countries). The company accumulates patents from 
individuals, companies, and its own laboratory in Bellevue, Washington, in a wide 
range of fields to serve its numerous purposes, among them, the monetization of 
intellectual property. Id. at 8-17 (discussing Intellectual Ventures’s monetization of 
intellectual property by employing innovative business models). Intellectual Ventures 
handsomely collects royalties from companies that use any of its patented inventions. 
See Brier Dudley, Bellevue Lab Is an Inventor’s Real Dream, SEATTLE TIMES (May 27, 
2009, 6:01 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_ 
id=2009266390&zsection_id=2003907475&slug=intvent70&date=20090527. As of 2009, 
the company had collected $1 billion in royalties. Id. It is now one of the top twenty-five 
research institutions in the United States and one of the top fifty in the world based on 
annual patent productivity. Id. Intellectual Ventures provides financing to many 
companies and research universities to continue their invention productivities, and, in 
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resources creating and developing products and services 
covered by patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks.2 
If businesses lack the expertise, facilities, financing, or time, 
they license these intellectual property rights from others; 
segmentation is the business modus operandi.3 For tax, 
employment, and productivity reasons, multinational 
companies shuffle and migrate their intellectual property 
assets to favorable state and foreign jurisdictions. Some 
companies leverage their intellectual property assets for 
financing, while others leverage for litigation purposes.4 
Because intellectual property assets are highly valuable, 
companies seek different forms of intellectual property to 
protect their products or services, bundling multiple 
intellectual property rights.5 
The importance of intellectual property to U.S. business 
and the economy underscores the need for a sound tax policy 
governing intellectual property rights. Presently, the Internal 
Revenue Code contains several special rules governing 
intellectual property.6 Some special tax provisions affect a large 
group of intellectual property assets;7 most, however, cover only 
  
return, Intellectual Ventures gains the ownership of or exclusive rights in patented 
inventions. See Page, supra. 
 2 Government statistics reveal the high level of intellectual property 
development activity in the United States. In 2008, the United States Patent Office 
received 485,312 patent applications and of those granted 185,224 patents. U.S. Patent 
Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2009, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 20, 
2010, 1:04 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (providing 
statistics of patent applications and grants for each fiscal year). That same year, total 
trademark filings at the Trademark Office covered 401,392 classes of goods or services 
and 430,343 disposals, which are “abandonments of applications plus issued 
registrations.” Trademark Pub. Advisory Comm., Annual Report, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. 4 (2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/reports/tpac_ 
2008annualrpt.pdf. Also during 2008, the Copyright Office received 561,428 copyright 
claims, of which 232,907 were registered, as well as 526,508 copies of registered and 
unregistered works valued at $24 million. Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFF. (Jun. 8, 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat060409.html. The 
Copyright Office recorded more than 330,000 titles of works in fiscal year 2008. Id. 
 3 See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.  
 4  See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. 
U. L. REV. 775, 791 (2008) [hereinafter Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation] 
(describing how some companies without “resources, personnel, and facilities to 
conduct further research and development or to create end products or services” realize 
their returns on the patent portfolios by finding “potentially deep-pocketed infringers” 
and forcing them to pay “through litigation and threat of injunction”); Xuan-Thao 
Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2007) 
(explaining how companies leverage intellectual property assets to obtain financing). 
 5  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 6 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
 7 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(6), 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), 170(m), 197 (2006). 
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specific types of intellectual property.8 While these rules were 
largely designed to address the shortcomings of traditional 
taxation principles in the intellectual property context,9 
ironically, many special tax rules are circumscribed in ways 
that relegate the tax analysis back to these traditional 
principles.10 Thus, the current income tax system governing 
intellectual property is a mix of special tax rules and general 
taxation principles. 
Ideally, the current intellectual property tax system 
should embrace the principles of fairness and efficiency. While 
few would disagree that fairness and efficiency, in the abstract, 
are important features of any tax policy, disagreement may 
arise over the applied meaning of these two criteria. The first 
criterion—tax fairness—is usually described in terms of 
horizontal equity.11 Horizontal equity requires that persons who 
are similarly situated should be taxed in a similar fashion.12 A 
  
 8 See, e.g., id. §§ 41, 167(f)(1), 167(g)(8), 174, 1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, 1253. 
 9 See infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text. 
 11 See JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FEDERAL TAXATION 4 (2d ed. 2010); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. 
SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28 (6th ed. 2009). 
 12  See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 4; GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 
11, at 28. Horizontal equity has been compared to the constitutional principle of equal 
protection under the laws. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1; see also Richard A. Musgrave, 
Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation, 18 J. PUB. 
ECON. 1 (1982).  
  Some modern theorists question the utility of horizontal equity in tax 
policy analysis, contending that horizontal equity lacks independent significance and is 
devoid of any normative content. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 
607 (1993). For the actual debate between Professors Louis Kaplow and Richard 
Musgrave over the merits of horizontal equity, see Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: 
Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (1989); Louis Kaplow, A Note on 
Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992) [hereinafter Kaplow, A Note] 
(contending horizontal and vertical equity are aspects of the same principle); 
Musgrave, supra; Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX 
REV. 354 (1993) [hereinafter Musgrave, A Further Note] (arguing horizontal equity has 
independent significance distinct from vertical equity); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Tax 
Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1193-94 (noting criticism of horizontal equity as lacking 
independent significance); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. 
TAX REV. 39, 89-97 (1996) (summarizing criticisms of horizontal equity). 
  Critics often point to the difficulty of determining relevant likeness (i.e., 
the comparison of taxpayers and economic activities). Kaplow, A Note, supra, at 192-93; 
McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 612-13. But see Musgrave, A Further Note, supra, at 359; 
see also Zolt, supra, at 95 (“Defining horizontal equity as requiring equal tax treatment 
for individuals who are, in all relevant aspects, equal accomplishes little. It just begs 
the question of what is relevant. . . . The principle of horizontal equity does nothing to 
determine which differences justify different tax treatment.”). Requiring equal 
treatment for equals, they argue, merely begs the question of what equals actually are.  
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related concept of equity is that economically equivalent 
activities should be taxed in the same manner even if they 
differ in form.13 Horizontal equity was once considered the 
primary goal of tax policy,14 and even if no longer held in quite 
this same regard, it nonetheless remains an important 
principle of tax theory.15 
  
  But this objection rests on an “exaggerated view of the level of precision 
required in order for equality to have meaning.” John A. Miller, Equal Taxation: A 
Commentary, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 529, 545 (2000) (“All of our major tax schemes have 
found ways to determine likeness (or difference) that are generally recognized as fair.”). 
As one commentator notes, “[H]orizontal equity is concerned with individuals who are 
‘similarly situated,’ not with those who are ‘identically situated.’” David Elkins, 
Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44 (2006) 
(“Tautologically, any conceivable tax arrangement will treat identically situated 
taxpayers equally. . . . Taxpayers are similarly situated when their situations are 
considered equivalent.”). Moreover, even if this criticism of horizontal equity is valid, 
horizontal equity could nevertheless serve as a useful tool to uncover potential problems 
in a tax system. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal 
Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 651 (2006). For 
example, the tax system’s differential treatment of two intellectual property owners that 
appear to be in similar economic circumstances might signal a flaw in the intellectual 
property tax system, or it might at least challenge us to justify disparate treatment. 
  Some critics also question the use of horizontal equity to analyze tax 
expenditures (i.e., tax credits and deductions), arguing that a tax expenditure is a subsidy 
that occurs outside of traditional tax equity analysis. McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 621. 
In the context of home ownership, Professor Miller has argued that horizontal equity 
analysis can actually challenge us to justify disparate treatment between homeowners 
and renters caused by the mortgage interest deduction. Miller, supra, at 537-38. 
Likewise, in the context of intellectual property ownership, horizontal equity analysis can 
challenge us to justify disparate tax treatment that exists between individual patent and 
copyright creators and corporations whose employees invent or create. 
 13 See Kahn, supra note 12, at 647 (using the term “parallelism” for the 
proposition that “the same or equivalent receipts, expenditures or losses should be 
treated the same by the tax law”; non-parallelism “results in disparate tax treatment of 
taxpayers who occupy similar positions”); Zolt, supra note 12, at 49 (using the term 
“uniform taxation,” which rests on the concept of horizontal equity, “to refer to tax 
treatment in accordance with some general approach . . . without any differentiation as 
to type of income or type of taxpayer,” and using the term “nonuniform taxation” to 
refer “to tax rules that vary by type of income or type of taxpayer”). 
 14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A 
STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 160 (1959) (“Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of 
equity in taxation is that people in equal positions should be treated equally.”); HENRY 
C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 11 (1950) (“Equity in this primary sense must, in an 
advanced nation, predominate over, if not wholly override, all other objectives.”); see 
also Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 
574-80 (1965). 
 15 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12 (discussing the merits of horizontal equity 
analysis); Elkins, supra note 12 (showing independence of horizontal equity as a 
principle of tax theory); Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1323, 
1328, 1335-62 (2008) (providing justifications for tax fairness and claiming that 
horizontal equity “can be defended as an essential feature of the revenue function of 
taxation” and can operate on principles of its own); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy 
Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645 (2003) (arguing equity and 
efficiency, as opposed to simplicity, are core values); Kahn, supra note 12 (recognizing 
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The second criterion of sound tax policy—efficiency—
has been measured by contradictory standards and means 
various things in various contexts.16 Ideally, a tax system 
should be administratively efficient; the costs of administering 
and complying with intellectual property tax rules should be 
minimized. Efficiency in tax theory can also be measured in 
terms of economic growth.17 Under this standard, the 
intellectual property tax system would be viewed as efficient if 
it promoted economic growth18 and inefficient if it inhibited 
such growth.19 Thus, tax subsidies—in the form of deductions, 
credits, and lower tax rates—for certain intellectual property 
activities might upset the free market allocations of capital, but 
  
equal treatment of the same items serves the normative goal of fairness, but arguing 
that parallelism need not necessarily prevail over other legitimate goals). 
 16 See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 4; see also GRAETZ & SCHENK, 
supra note 11, at 29-30 (summarizing various meanings of the efficiency criterion). 
 17  Alternatively, efficiency can be viewed as a utilitarian concept that seeks a 
balance between maximizing tax revenues and minimizing the social costs of taxation. 
See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 4; Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income 
Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 978-1012 (1986); 
Herman P. Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic Concept or Budgetary 
Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES 1152 (2001); Zolt, supra note 12, at 63 (“Efficient taxes 
distort as little as possible”; describing three forms in which distortions come). 
According to this standard, an optimal intellectual property tax system would be 
neutral—that is, it would not interfere with intellectual property owners’ economic 
behavior and would avoid deadweight losses caused by restructuring of intellectual 
property transactions to minimize taxes. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29 
(stating that efficiency requires that a tax interfere as little as possible with people’s 
economic behavior); Elkins, supra note 12, at 47 (stating that efficient taxes minimize 
deadweight losses caused by taxpayer actions to reduce tax burden by choosing courses 
of action that minimize tax). 
  But this standard is of questionable value in the context of intellectual 
property taxation. Most intellectual property tax rules are deliberately not neutral; 
thus, under this standard, these rules generate high efficiency costs. Many of the 
special tax provisions governing patents and copyrights, for example, were a deliberate 
attempt to support the social-utility mandate of patent and copyright laws. Tax 
expenditures in the form of deductions and credit for certain research and 
development, and short write-off periods for certain intellectual property acquisitions, 
were deliberately designed to drive economic decision-making to achieve more 
important intellectual property social policies. Whether tax expenditures (i.e., 
deductions and credits used to influence behavior) represent sound tax policy has been 
the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Zelinksky, supra; Ayayo, supra. In any event, at 
least with respect to the intellectual property tax scheme, neutrality violations are 
inevitable to achieve more important intellectual property social engineering policies 
and to advance the public interest. 
 18 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29 (“The efficiency criterion 
sometimes has other meanings. A tax often is said to be efficient when it promotes 
economic growth and inefficient when it inhibits such growth.”); Edward Yorio, The 
President’s Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1255, 1262-63 (1985) (examining economic growth as a principal criterion of sound 
federal income tax policy). 
 19  GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29. 
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they might be justified because the targeted activities involve 
significant beneficial externalities.20 And if these subsidies 
correctly quantify society’s interests, according to the economic-
growth efficiency standard, they contribute to market 
efficiency.21  
The design of any tax system involves tradeoffs between 
equity and efficiency principles.22 It may be efficient to provide 
tax breaks to certain innovators because society as a whole 
benefits from high innovation via encouragement of individual 
effort through personal gain.23 But such measures may violate 
horizontal equity because conflicts between equity and 
efficiency are often inevitable byproducts. The government 
must therefore establish reasonable tradeoffs when designing 
an intellectual property tax system.24 For example, the 
government might decide to grant equity primacy over 
efficiency or vice versa.25 If inequity gives way to efficiency, a 
certain level of inequity might be acceptable; in other words, 
horizontal equity violations might sometimes be justified but 
only if the efficiency gains are significant.26 
  
 20 Under an economic-growth efficiency standard, the tax system might be said 
to be efficient even if neutrality violations upset the free market allocations of capital. For 
example, if policymakers chose to adopt a lower tax on patent owners vis-à-vis copyright 
owners to stimulate the economy, capital might flow from the copyright segment to the 
patent segment as a result of the tax change. 
 21 Elkins, supra note 12, at 48 (“Where the economic activity concerned 
produces beneficial externalities, a negative tax (i.e., a subsidy) may be offered. . . . 
When the subsidy correctly quantifies society’s interests, it actually contributes to the 
efficiency in the market.”). 
 22 See id. (arguing efficiency is not necessarily horizontally equitable); Miller, 
supra note 12, at 541 (“Equity and efficiency principles will often coincide.”); Zolt, 
supra note 12, at 85 (concluding that “nonuniform tax treatment may yield efficiency 
gains not available under uniform taxation”). 
 23 Under the contradictory efficiency standard discussed supra note 17, some 
would argue that such tax breaks to innovators violate the principle of neutrality by 
encouraging taxpayers to choose patent activities over other intellectual property 
activities. Under this view, the greater the inequity, the greater the inefficiency. 
 24 Elkins, supra note 12, at 68 (“[E]very tax system must allow some degree 
of inequality in order to encourage beneficial economic activity.”); Zolt, supra note 12, 
at 60-85 (examining choices where unequal treatment yields efficiency gains). 
 25 See Zolt, supra note 12, at 99 (While “efficiency and equity may conflict, 
[o]ne approach could [be to] grant primacy to equity, regardless of efficiency 
considerations.”). 
 26 Id. at 100 (“If efficiency gains are minor, then there may be strong reasons 
for not adopting provisions that have inequity, or the perception of inequity. The 
presumption should be in favor of uniform tax treatment where gains from nonuniform 
treatment cannot be adequately justified. Where we can demonstrate substantial 
efficiency gains, rejecting proposals on equity grounds becomes more problematic.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
2010] EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN IP TAXATION 7 
This article evaluates the current U.S. income tax 
regime governing intellectual property by focusing on the 
traditional principles of tax policy—tax fairness and efficiency. 
It highlights the shortcomings of the current tax system in 
fulfilling both of these tenets. It begins, in Part I, with an 
overview of intellectual property rights, highlighting 
substantive similarities and differences among patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks. Part II turns to the current 
intellectual property tax system. It evaluates the intellectual 
property tax scheme in terms of horizontal equity, identifying 
differences in tax treatment of what appear to be similar 
intellectual property activities. Part III assesses the efficiency 
of the intellectual property tax system. Specifically, it examines 
numerous tax subsidies for intellectual property and their 
effectiveness in promoting economic growth. It argues that 
many of these tax expenditures are circumscribed to have 
limited effectiveness and thus do not optimally contribute to 
economic growth. It also argues that the current intellectual 
property tax regime, with varying rules for different types of 
intellectual property, does not provide necessary certainty and 
clarity for sound administration and compliance with the law. 
As an example, the intellectual property tax system is not 
easily applied to evolving intellectual property rights and 
trends, such as the bundling of intellectual property rights in 
actual practice.  
Finally, Part IV proffers guidelines for the government 
in designing a more efficient and equitable tax system for 
intellectual property. As to the efficiency criterion, a legal 
framework should establish the proper role, if any, of the tax 
system in promoting beneficial intellectual property activity.27 
While the current tax system aims to promote the innovation 
goals of patents and patent-like property through various tax 
expenditures, it arguably hinders beneficial copyright and 
trademark goals through the absence of adequate tax 
incentives.28 This article questions this result, viewing most 
intellectual property rights as achieving similar goals—namely, 
innovation and/or efficiency policy objectives—and taking a 
broad view of intellectual property’s positive effects on society. 
As to the equity criterion, a legal framework should establish a 
basis for rational tax distinctions among intellectual property 
  
 27  See infra Part IV.A-B.  
 28 See infra notes 211-34 and accompanying text. 
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forms if distinctions are to be maintained. One solution would 
be to base tax distinctions not on the legal attributes of 
intellectual property, which has been the historical approach, 
but on the intellectual property purposes that intellectual 
property assets serve. Instead of developing separate tax rules 
for identified intangibles, creating legal definitions and carving 
out exceptions, different tax results could be dictated by 
whether intellectual property is technology-based, marketing-
based, or artistic-based—categories the government has 
adopted for financial reporting purposes. 
I. OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Before evaluating the intellectual property tax scheme, 
it is useful to examine the nature of intellectual property 
rights. In American law, “intellectual property rights often 
cover . . . patents, copyrights, and trademarks.”29 In contrast to 
tangible property, which is visible and has physical existence, 
intellectual property is intangible and has no physical 
existence.30 Intangible intellectual property rights are separate 
  
 29 See generally Nguyen, supra note 4, at 6. Computer technology poses 
challenges to intellectual property doctrines. Copyright law has traditionally served as 
the source of legal protection for computer programs. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic 
Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he copyrightability of computer 
programs is firmly established after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act.”). 
Copyright law now defines computer software, extends the exclusive rights in a 
copyright to copyrightable computer software, and imposes limitations on the exclusive 
rights to allow certain statutorily noninfringing use of the copyrightable computer 
software. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2006). In addition to copyright law, patent protection 
has been extended to computer software. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
 30 Current tax rules for intangible intellectual property differ substantially 
from tax rules for tangible property, with intellectual property treated less favorably 
than tangible property in many instances. For example, the costs of purchasing certain 
machines and equipment for active use in businesses are immediately deductible, see 
I.R.C. § 179 (2006) (allowing taxpayers to elect to expense the costs of certain tangible 
property), but the costs of purchasing intellectual property assets for use in businesses 
are not and must be capitalized, id. § 263(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i), -4(c)(1) 
(2004). In addition, the purchase price for a computer can be written off over a period of 
five years, I.R.C. §§ 167, 168(c), 168(e)(3)(B) (2006), but the purchase price for custom 
software to run the computer must be written off over either three years or fifteen 
years, depending on how the software was acquired, id. § 167(f) (providing a three-year 
recovery period for separately acquired computer software); id. § 197 (providing a 
fifteen-year recovery period for software acquired as part of the acquisition of a trade or 
business). Similarly, a charitable contribution of a building provides the donor with a 
tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the building, id. § 170(a); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-1(c) (as amended in 2008), whereas a charitable contribution of a patent 
provides the donor with a deduction equal to the donor’s basis, I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) 
(2006). In these and other instances, the current tax system treats intellectual property 
inconsistently with, and less favorably than, tangible property.   
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from the physical objects containing the intellectual property. 
Ownership of a book, for example, does not mean ownership of 
the copyright of the book.  
Patents and copyrights are substantively similar in 
many respects. Patents and copyrights are both intangible 
personal property.31 While neither has a physical form, both are 
generally dependent on physical forms for their creative 
existence.32 In addition, both confer similar exclusivity rights. 
Just as patent owners can exclude others from using, making, 
selling, or exporting their patented products,33 copyright owners 
enjoy the exclusive right to make copies, prepare derivative 
works, distribute the copyrighted work, and publicly perform 
and display the work.34 The same clause of the U.S. 
Constitution empowers Congress to promote the progress of 
both science and the useful arts.35 In response, Congress has 
granted significant protections for both patents and 
copyrights.36  
  
 31 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:4 
(4th ed. 2008) (“That there are many common characteristics of patents . . . and 
copyrights cannot be denied. They all share the attributes of personal property, and are 
referred to en masse as ‘intellectual property’ or ‘proprietary rights.’”). 
 32 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual 
Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453, 499-500 (2006) (“[O]bjects of intellectual property 
have no separate, natural, empirical existence. They ‘exist’ contingently and only 
insofar as not only their creator, but also other subjects, recognize them as such.”); Dan 
L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538 (2005) (stating intellectual property is generally “embodied 
in particular physical forms—on paper, on canvas, on magnetic or optical media—that 
can be guarded from a physical theft”). 
 33 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“[T]he 
Patent Act also declares that ‘patents shall have the attributes of personal property,’ 
including ‘the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention.’” (citations omitted)). 
 34 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33 
(1984) (“Copyright Act grants copyright holder ‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize 
the use of his work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted 
work in copies.” (citation omitted)). 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 36 Congress passed both patent and copyright legislation in 1790 during the 
first congressional session. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (current version at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)); Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006)). The patent statutes went through major revision in 1952. 
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (noting certain amendments to patent 
statutes in 1952 and what Congress revised in that year); Graham v. John Deere Co. of 
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1966) (discussing the Patent Act of 1952). Copyright 
laws witnessed two major revisions: the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 
1976. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. 
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Copyrights include the exclusive rights to make copies, 
prepare derivative works, distribute the works, display the 
works in public, and perform the works in public.37 Copyright 
law requires that a work of authorship be original and fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression.38 Works of authorship cover a 
wide range of subject matters—for example, movies, video 
games, software, music, and books;39 originality means that the 
works must be created independently by the author and must 
bear some degree of creativity.40 The bundle of rights does not 
last forever, however, as it faces a time limit.41 This time 
limitation is consistent with the Founding Fathers’ intent in 
drafting the Patent and Copyright Clause. While the Founding 
Fathers clearly sought to award authors exclusive rights to 
their works—based on the belief that a reward-based system 
would “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”42—they 
also understood that an unfettered right would do little to 
promote such cultural progress and therefore placed a time 
  
v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 47-51 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing changes 
and legislative history of copyright statutes). 
 37 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.4 (2001); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under 
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to 
display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”). 
 38 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . .”). 
 39 Id. § 102(a) provides a list of categories for works of authorship: “(1) 
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic 
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.” 
 40 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1991) 
(stating that “[o]riginality requires only that the author make the selection or 
arrangement independently . . . and that it display some minimal level of creativity. 
Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not all will. There 
remains a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so 
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.” (citation omitted)). 
 41 See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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limit on the exclusivity for copyrights, the same as they did for 
patents.43  
As with patents, the exclusive rights in copyrights, 
though limited in time, are granted to encourage the progress 
of science and the useful arts for the benefit of society.44 There 
is a long-held belief that copyright protection promotes 
innovation and the “creative activity of authors,”45 and induces 
authors and artists to “release to the public . . . the products of 
his creative genius.”46 Technological advances in the 
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, however, 
force new changes in copyright law, as Congress continually 
searches for a balance between copyright protection47 and 
future innovations. 
Despite their similarities, there are many substantive 
differences between patents and copyrights. For example, the 
legal life of a patent is dictated by the federal patent statute 
and lasts twenty years from the date of patent application.48 
The legal life of a copyright under the federal copyright statute 
is much longer; it spans the life of the original author plus 
  
 43 Id. 
 44 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy 
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and 
useful Arts.’”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) 
(“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration. . . . It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release 
to the public of the products of his creative genius.”). 
 45 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(explaining that “[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the 
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a 
special reward”). But see Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1205, 1209, 1213-15 (1996) (arguing that “demonstrating how 
neither the need to generate creative activity nor the desire to reward deserving 
authors provides a plausible justification for current copyright doctrine”). 
 46 Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158; see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy 
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1970) (examining the “property” right in 
copyrights and asserting that “property rights are often created for reasons of 
efficiency” rather than “solely on the basis of labor expended”). 
 47 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright Clause 
empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that 
body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause. . . . Congress may ‘implement the 
stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best 
effectuates the constitutional aim.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966))). 
 48 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing that the patent term is twenty years 
from an effective filing date). 
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seventy years after the author’s death.49 If the author is an 
entity, the life of the copyright is 120 years from the date of 
creation or 95 years from the date of publication, whichever 
expires first.50  
In contrast to patent and copyright laws, Congress 
relied on the Commerce Clause to pass the trademark 
statutes.51 Unlike patent and copyright laws, trademark laws 
do not exist to reward trademark owners for innovations of 
products or services.52 Rather, trademark laws are recognized 
as important to facilitate efficiency.53 Specifically, trademark 
laws prevent competitors from copying source-identifying 
marks and minimizing the likelihood of consumer confusion.54 
Consumers can rely on the trademarks in their decision of 
whether to purchase a product or service.55 Consequently, 
trademark laws reduce the consumers’ costs of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions and help assure “a producer that 
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, 
  
 49 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 50 17 U.S.C. § 302; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition 
of Publication in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1733 (2008) (reviewing the 
statutory provision for the legal life of a copyright created by natural authors and 
works made for hire). 
 51  Nguyen, supra note 4, at 8. 
 52 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, (2001). 
“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in 
creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of 
exclusivity.” Id. at 34. Federal trademark law “has no necessary relation to invention 
or discovery.” In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 53 See Int’l Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle Des 
Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that “the very real 
interest that our trademark laws have in minimizing consumer confusion” is to ensure 
“that our economy may enjoy the greatest possible of efficiencies”). William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
265-66 (1987) (“Our overall conclusion is that trademark law . . . can best be explained 
on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency”).  
 54 See Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(commenting that “[t]rademark protection is desirable because of the efficiencies and 
incentives produced by symbolic affiliation of producer and quality product”).  
 55 Many commentators also believe that trademarks foster efficiency in 
information and search costs “‘by providing a compact, memorable and unambiguous 
identifier of a product or service.” Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal 
Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 
1148 (2006) (quoting Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 
75 (1992)). 
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reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable 
product.”56 
II. EVALUATING EQUITY IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
TAX SYSTEM  
Having introduced the characteristics of intellectual 
property rights, we turn to the current tax system governing 
those rights. Ideally, the income tax regime for intellectual 
property transactions should embrace the principle of fairness.57 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate a tax system governing 
intangible rights from an equity perspective because these 
rights involve such a broad range of economic activities that no 
two taxpayers will be situated exactly equally. For example, 
should a person selling a literary copyright and a person selling 
a musical copyright be treated as equals for tax purposes? 
Should a seller of computer software protected as a patent be 
viewed as similarly situated to a seller of similar computer 
software that is protected as a trade secret? Should a purchaser 
of a domain name functioning as a trademark be considered 
equal to a purchaser of a generic domain name? Is a person 
who donates intellectual property to a large university engaged 
in applied research similar to a person who donates similar 
intellectual property to a small college engaged in 
fundamental, purely scientific research? 
  
 56 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995). As 
explained by the Court in Qualitex, 
In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making 
purchasing decisions,” for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer 
that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as 
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At 
the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated 
with a desirable product. The law thereby “encourage[s] the production of 
quality products,” and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell 
inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate 
the quality of an item offered for sale. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the 
Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (stating that trademark 
law promotes efficiency as consumers reduce their research cost by relying on brand 
names); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841-43, 1848 (2007) (critiquing the law and economic approach to 
trademark law which emphasizes economic efficiency of trademark law purposes). 
 57 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
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Viewing all intellectual property owners as equals and 
treating them equally for tax purposes would have unarguable 
appeal. Consider the general tax treatment of both patents and 
copyrights. The legal protections granted to patents and 
copyrights are very similar in substance—both essentially 
functioning as grants of monopolies.58 If the intellectual 
property system treats patents and copyrights similarly, the 
tax rules designed to support the system might also treat them 
similarly—an approach that seems consistent with tax notions 
of fairness.59  
A fundamental problem with the current intellectual 
property tax system, however, is inconsistency. Patent and 
copyright owners are treated equally in some tax contexts but 
unequally in others. For example, the acquisition costs of 
patents and copyrights are treated similarly for tax purposes,60 
as are patent and copyright donations.61 But the taxation of 
development costs differs between patents and copyrights. 
Patent development costs are deductible when incurred,62 
whereas most copyright creation costs must be capitalized.63 
Likewise, sales of self-developed patents are generally entitled 
to preferential capital-gains treatment,64 while sales of most 
self-created copyrights are generally not.65  
  
 58 See supra text accompanying notes 31-47. 
 59 See supra text accompanying notes 11-15. 
 60 See I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (e)(4)(C) (2006) (providing a fifteen-year amortization 
period for patents and copyrights acquired in a transaction involving the acquisition of 
assets constituting a trade or business); see also id. § 167; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3 (as 
amended in 2004), 1.167(a)-14 (as amended in 2006) (providing alternative 
depreciation rules for patents and copyrights acquired separately). 
 61 See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (e)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (limiting initial charitable 
contribution tax deduction to adjusted basis in donated patents and copyrights). 
 62 See id. § 174(a) (allowing taxpayers to “treat research or experimental 
expenditures which are paid or incurred . . . during the taxable year in connection 
with . . . trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account”); 
id. § 263(a)(1)(B) (providing that the capitalization rules under section 263(a) do not 
apply to “research and experimental expenditures deductible under section 174[a]”). 
 63 See id. § 263(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii), -4(b)(3), -4(d)(5) (2004) 
(requiring capitalization of costs of obtaining rights from a governmental agency, as 
well as costs of creating any “separate and distinct intangible asset”); see also I.R.C. 
§ 263A(a)-(b) (2006) (requiring capitalization of all direct and indirect expenditures 
incurred to produce creative properties, such as films, sound recordings, video tapes, 
books, and similar properties that embody the words, ideas, concepts, images, or 
sounds by the creators thereof). But see id. § 263A(h) (providing an exception from the 
capitalization requirement, permitting certain freelance writers, photographers, and 
artists to deduct any “qualified creative expense” that would otherwise be capitalized). 
 64 See I.R.C. § 1235 (2006) (providing statutory assurance to certain individual 
inventors that the sale of their patents will qualify for reduced capital-gains rates). 
 65 See id. §§ 1221(a)(3) (excluding from the definition of capital asset a 
literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar property held by the creator), 
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To be sure, there are distinctions between patents and 
copyrights.66 But even if patent owners are different from 
copyright owners, based on tax equity principles, two patent 
owners that are similarly situated, or two copyright owners 
whose situations are similar, should be taxed in a similar 
fashion. Under the current intellectual property tax regime, 
however, this is not the case, raising serious equity concerns.67 
A. Inequities in the Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property 
Development Costs 
Since the inception of the modern federal income tax 
system, the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) has precluded 
a current deduction for so-called “capital expenditures,” 
historically defined as any expenditure that produces an asset 
lasting beyond the current tax period.68 With respect to 
intellectual property development expenditures, though, 
Congress has specifically legislated specific exceptions to asset 
capitalization,69 and the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) 
has administratively created additional exceptions.70 These 
legislative and administrative exceptions to normative 
capitalization have inequitable results. The following example 
is illustrative. 
  
1231(b)(1)(C). But see id. § 1221(b)(3) (providing an exception for sales of musical 
compositions and copyrights in musical works). 
 66 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
 67 Many of the inequities identified here in the tax treatment of intellectual 
property do not exist in the tax treatment of tangible real or personal property.  
 68 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (providing “[t]hat no 
deduction shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent 
improvements, or betterments, made to increase the value of any property”). For the 
current disallowance provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (2006). The reason capitalized 
expenditures are not currently deductible is that the property created or acquired is 
not consumed or used up within the year, but rather continues to contribute to income 
over a period of years. If the costs incurred in the creation or acquisition of such 
property were deductible in full in the current year, there would be a mismatch of 
income to expenses that produced that income; income would be understated in the 
year of creation or acquisition and overstated in later years. By prohibiting the 
immediate deduction of capital expenditures, this problem is avoided. 
 69 See I.R.C. §§ 174 (allowing a deduction for research and experimental 
expenditures that would otherwise be capitalized), 263A(h) (allowing a deduction for 
qualified creative expenses incurred by freelance authors, writers, and photographers 
that would otherwise be capitalized) (2006). 
 70 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii), -4(b)(3)(v) (2004) (allowing a 
deduction for graphic and package design costs even though long-term trademark and 
copyright protections are obtained on such designs); Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, 
updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 
2007-16, 2007-1 C.B. 358 (allowing a current deduction for software development costs 
regardless of method length of intellectual property protection). 
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Consider two novice inventors, Inventor A and Inventor 
B. Each spends $100,000 to develop her first patented 
invention. Inventor A plans to enter a future business of her 
own with her developed technology, marketing the technology 
herself. Inventor B, however, plans to license his developed 
technology to a company that will market the developed 
technology to its customers. Inventor A and Inventor B appear 
similarly situated; each spends $100,000, and each obtains 
patent protections for similar technologies that will be 
exploited in the commercial marketplace. Nevertheless, under 
the present tax system, Inventor A and Inventor B are not 
treated equally. Inventor A may currently deduct $100,000 in 
research costs, but Inventor B may not. This disparate 
treatment stems from Section 17471 of the Code, which allows a 
current deduction only for research expenditures incurred “in 
connection with” the inventor’s trade or business.72 While a 
taxpayer need not be currently conducting a business (i.e., 
producing or selling any product) for research or experimental 
expenditures to meet Section 174’s “in connection with a trade 
or business” requirement,73 courts have required that a 
taxpayer show a realistic prospect of entering into a trade or 
business in the future that will exploit the technology under 
development.74 To do so, the taxpayer must demonstrate both 
an objective intent to enter into the trade or business, and the 
ability to perform the business.75  
  
 71 I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Prior to 1974, the IRS and the courts took the position that to qualify for 
Section 174 treatment, a taxpayer must already have engaged in a trade or business. 
See Best Universal Lock Co. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 1 (1965), acq., 1966-2 C.B. 4 (1966); 
Koons v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1092, 1098, 1100 (1961). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
this narrow approach and held that pre-operational research or experimental 
expenditures could qualify for the Section 174 deduction. Snow v. Comm’r, 416 U.S. 
500, 503-04 (1974). 
 74 Kantor v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he taxpayer must 
demonstrate a ‘realistic prospect’ of subsequently entering its own business in connection 
with the fruits of the research, assuming that the research is successful.”); see also Zink v. 
United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991); Spellman v. Comm’r, 845 F.2d 148, 
149-50 (7th Cir. 1988); Stauber v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2258 (1992); Diamond v. 
Comm’r, 92 T.C. 423, 439 (1989), aff’d, 930 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 75 See Kantor, 998 F.2d at 1518-19 (holding that the partnership possessed 
neither “the objective intent nor the capacity of entering such a business” at the time it 
incurred research expenditures); Diamond, 930 F.2d at 375 (“The question is not 
whether it is possible in principle, or by further contract, for [the taxpayer] to engage in 
a trade or business, but whether, in reality, the [taxpayer] possessed the capability in 
the years before the court to enter into a new trade or business in connection with the 
[products being developed].”); Glassley v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2898 (1996) 
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As a general rule, the receipt of royalties alone does not 
constitute a trade or business.76 In one recent case, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision that denied current 
deductions to a computer software developer who did not 
market the developed technology himself, but instead licensed 
the technology to another company for use in that company’s 
trade or business.77 The court concluded that mere licensing of 
the developed technology did not meet the requisite trade or 
business standard in the statute. A few Tax Court decisions 
have held that research activities, and exploitation of the 
resulting inventions by sale or license, may constitute a trade 
or business.78 But these cases involved inventors who had 
developed a series of inventions.79 Thus, in practice, Section 174 
fails to recognize the important role of technology licensing and 
favors only inventive activities of a sufficiently sustained 
character.  
As with patent development activity, not all 
economically equivalent copyright creation activities are 
treated equally for tax purposes. As crafted, the legislative and 
administrative exceptions to the asset-capitalization rule 
produce different tax results depending on the status of the 
copyright creator—as an individual versus a corporation—and, 
in some cases, on the nature of the property embodying the 
copyright.80 In general, costs incurred in creating works that 
are subject to copyright protection are not currently 
  
(denying Section 174 deductions for expenditures to develop jojoba plants and seeds 
because taxpayer had neither intent nor capability to enter jojoba farming business). 
 76 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 113 (1981) (laying out rules for the 
application of Section 174, but not explicitly naming licensing as a trade or business 
that entitles taxpayers to relief under that provision). 
 77 Saykally v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1401 (2003), aff’d, 247 F. App’x 914 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 78 See Kilroy v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 292, 295 (1980) (permitting 
deductions where actions, over a period of years, relating to inventing activities 
suggested taxpayers were engaged in the trade or business of inventing); Louw v. 
Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 1422-23 (1971) (permitting deductions since taxpayer’s 
freelance inventive activities were of sufficiently sustained character to qualify as 
engaging in a trade or business of an inventor); Avery v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A. 538, 542 
(1942) (permitting business deductions where taxpayer “held the patents [to his 
inventions] for sale or license to others for profit”). 
 79 See Kilroy, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 295 (“numerous patents”); Avery, 47 B.T.A. 
at 540 (“about a dozen patents”). But see Cleveland v. Comm’r, 297 F.2d 169, 173 (4th 
Cir. 1961) (deeming a single invention held by a joint venture to be sufficient). 
 80  The nature of the copyright creator (individual versus entity) can produce 
different tax results. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. The nature of the 
property embodying the copyright can also produce different tax results. See supra 
notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
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deductible,81 but Congress has carved out a narrow exception 
for certain costs incurred by individual writers, photographers, 
and artists when engaged in their respective trades.82 As a 
result, expenses incurred by an individual author in writing a 
book are currently deductible, but similar creative costs 
incurred by a book publishing company (costs of writing, 
editing, and designing) must be capitalized.  
Although corporate taxpayers must generally capitalize 
copyright creation costs, capitalization is not required if the 
subject of copyright protection is computer software83 or certain 
advertising materials.84 As a result, a corporation may not 
deduct the costs of developing copyrighted books, films, or 
songs, but it may deduct the costs of developing copyrighted 
software, graphic designs, and package designs used in 
advertising. Ironically, the value produced in each case lies not 
in the different tangibles embodying the copyright, but in the 
  
 81 Section 174 does not apply to copyright creation expenses because such 
expenses do not constitute “research and experimental expenditures” within the 
meaning of Section 174. See Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1)-(2) (as amended in 1994). 
Section 162 generally does not apply to copyright creation costs as the Code requires 
such costs to be capitalized. See I.R.C. § 263(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2004) 
(requiring capitalization of costs of obtaining rights from a governmental agency, as 
well as costs of creating any “separate and distinct intangible asset”); see also I.R.C. 
§ 263A(a)-(b) (2006) (requiring capitalization of all direct and indirect expenditures 
incurred to produce creative properties, such as films, sound recordings, video tapes, 
books, and similar properties that embody the words, ideas, concepts, images, or 
sounds by the creators thereof).  
 82 I.R.C. § 263A(h) (2006) (providing an exception from the capitalization 
requirement, permitting certain freelance writers, photographers, and artists to deduct 
“qualified creative expenses” that would otherwise have to be capitalized). 
 83 Under a longstanding administrative ruling, software development costs 
are treated the same (i.e., currently deductible) regardless of whether the software is 
protected by patent, copyright, or trade secret. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, 
updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 
2007-16, 2007-1 C.B. 358. 
 84 As a general rule, the government allows taxpayers to currently deduct 
advertising costs notwithstanding the fact that advertising often produces benefits that 
continue well beyond the current taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
Only in unusual circumstances must the costs be capitalized, such as where 
advertising is directed toward obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those 
traditionally associated with ordinary product, institutional, or goodwill advertising. 
Id. Advertising expenditures often encompass the costs of creating materials that are 
copyrighted. An interesting question is whether the long-term intangible benefits 
provided by copyright protection should serve as the basis for requiring capitalization 
of advertising campaign expenditures. Or, should such costs be deductible because they 
resulted from “advertising” activities? In one case, the Tax Court allowed trade dress 
and copyright development costs to be deducted, even though such costs in a non-
advertising context most likely would have to be capitalized. R.J.R. Nabisco Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). 
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intangible copyright protections themselves.85 Even if the 
copyright protections are identical in each case, the tax 
consequences to the corporate creators differ significantly.86  
B. Inequities in the Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property 
Acquisition Costs 
Inequities in the tax treatment of intellectual property 
acquisition costs are also prevalent. Under the current tax 
system, the costs of acquiring intellectual property must first 
be capitalized87 and then are subject to a host of irrational tax 
depreciation rules.88 The methods89 and periods90 for recovering 
  
 85  Holders of copyrights enjoy the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, 
display, perform, and prepare derivatives of the works of authorship. That means 
holders of copyrights have more rights than mere ownership of the physical copy of the 
works of authorship. Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2071 (2009) (“[T]he physical ‘copy’ is excluded from the scope of 
copyright and the intangible ‘work’ or ‘work of authorship’ is regarded as the fruit of 
the author’s creative labors. The authority of the copyright itself, therefore, inheres in 
something other than the material form of the product. . . . A copyright in a novel 
covers the full text of the book, but it may also extend separately to its plot or even to a 
particular character.”); Gary Pulsinelli, Harry Potter and the (Re)Order of the Artists: 
Are We Muggles or Goblins?, 87 OR. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2008) (“Copyright law is 
concerned only with rights in the artistic design of an object, not with the right to the 
physical possession of a tangible object embodying that design.”); Ned Snow, Copytraps, 
84 IND. L.J. 285, 296 (2009) (noting that copyright holders exercise their reproduction 
and distribution rights under copyright law when they sell physical copies of their 
copyrighted works to consumers). 
 86 For a discussion of copyright protections, see supra notes 31-47 and 
accompanying text. 
 87 I.R.C. § 263 (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i), -4(c)(1) (2004) (“A 
taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to another party to acquire any intangible 
[property] from that party in a purchase or similar transaction.”). 
 88 In an economic sense, depreciation is the decline in value of an asset due to 
wear and tear and obsolescence. For tax purposes, depreciation is a deduction from 
income, permitting the taxpayer to recover the capitalized cost of that asset. 
Depreciation methods are sometimes called cost recovery systems. So, for example, if 
an asset used in business for five years costs a taxpayer $5000, the taxpayer might 
take a $1000 deduction each year on her taxes for five years to reflect the decline in 
value of that asset and to reflect its contribution to the production of taxable income. 
The entire cost of the asset is not deducted all at once because the asset helped produce 
income over five years. To match the taxpayer’s expenses against the revenues they 
helped produce, the taxpayer must spread out the deduction over the useful life of the 
asset. See generally MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 118-22. 
 89 Capitalized intellectual property costs are depreciated using either the 
straight-line method or the income-forecast method depending on a number of factors. See 
I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (e)(3)-(4) (2006) (requiring straight-line method for intellectual property 
acquired in connection with the acquisition of assets that constitute a trade or business); 
see also id. §§ 167(a), (g)(8); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), -14 (as 
amended in 2006), (b)-1 (as amended in 1960) (allowing either the straight-line method or 
the income-forecast method for intellectual property acquired separately). Accelerated or 
“bonus” depreciation methods that are available for depreciable tangible property are not 
available for intangible property. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (2006). But see I.R.C. §§ 197(e)(3), 
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capitalized intellectual property acquisition costs vary by the 
type of intellectual property acquired,91 the manner of 
procurement,92 and even the method of payment.93 Prescribed 
recovery periods, for example, range from three to fifteen years, 
  
179(a), (d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (permitting taxpayers to elect to deduct the cost of purchasing 
off-the-shelf computer software). 
  Under the straight-line method, acquisition costs are deducted ratably over 
the asset’s useful life or over a statutorily prescribed recovery period. Under the 
income-forecast method, acquisition costs are recovered as income is earned from 
exploitation of the patent. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, supplemented by Rev. Rul. 
64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62, supplemented by Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91. The 
depreciation allowance in any given year is computed by multiplying the original 
acquisition cost by a fraction, the numerator of which is income from the intellectual 
property for the taxable year and the denominator of which is forecasted or estimated 
total income to be earned in connection with the intellectual property during its useful 
life. Id. Consider the following example. In Year 1, Taxpayer purchases a patent for 
$100 and estimates that forecasted total income from the patent will be $200. In 
Year 1, the patent generates income of $80. The depreciation allowance for Year 1 is 
$40, computed by multiplying the acquisition cost of $100 by the fraction obtained by 
dividing current year income of $80 by forecasted total income of $200. Under this 
approach, 40% of forecasted income was earned in Year 1, so 40% of the total purchase 
cost was deducted in Year 1. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(b). 
 90 Some types of intellectual property are depreciated over an arbitrary 
fifteen-year period regardless of the intellectual property’s legal or useful life. See 
I.R.C. §§ 197(a)-(b), (d)(1)(C)(iii), (d)(1)(F) (2006). Other types are depreciated ratably 
over their useful life (i.e., under the straight-line method). Id. §§ 167(a), 197(e)(3)-(4); 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), (a)-14 (as amended in 2006), (b)-1 (as 
amended in 1960). Others are depreciated only as the intellectual property generates 
income (i.e., under the income-forecast method). I.R.C. § 167(g)(8) (2006); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.167(a)-14 (as amended in 2006). As with the appropriate depreciation method, the 
appropriate recovery period depends on a number of factors. 
 91 For example, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, and know-how are 
depreciated over fifteen years. I.R.C. §§ 197(a)-(b), (d)(1)(C)(iii), (d)(1)(F) (2006). Patents 
and copyrights acquired separately are depreciated over their useful lives under either 
the straight-line method or income-forecast method. Id. §§ 167(a), (g)(8); Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), -14(a) (as amended in 2008). Computer software 
acquired separately is generally deprecated over three years. I.R.C. § 167(f) (2006). 
 92 Intellectual property may be acquired in a transaction involving the 
acquisition of a trade or business or may be acquired separately or with a group of 
assets that collectively do not constitute a trade or business. For many types of 
intellectual property, such as patents, patent applications, and computer software, 
depreciation rules differ depending on the method of procurement (i.e., Section 197 
applies only if these assets are acquired with a business). See I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)-(4) 
(2006). For other types, such as trademarks, trade names, trade secrets and know-how, 
method of procurement is irrelevant (i.e., Section 197 applies regardless of whether 
these assets are acquired separately or with a business). See id. 
 93 As consideration, intellectual property transferees may make up-front 
principal payments, installment payments of a fixed amount, payments contingent on 
exploitation of the intellectual property, or use any combination of these methods. 
When contingent payments are made, depreciation rules differ depending on whether 
the intellectual property is acquired separately or acquired with a trade or business. 
For example, if a contingent payment is made for a patent acquired with a business, 
the contingent amount is written off over a fifteen-year period. Treas. Reg. § 1.197-
2(f)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008). If a contingent payment is made for a patent acquired 
separately, then the contingent amount is fully deductible in the year paid. Id. 
§ 1.167(a)-14(c)(4) (as amended in 2006). 
2010] EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN IP TAXATION 21 
depending on the type of intellectual property acquired and the 
manner of procurement: fifteen years for all acquired trade 
secrets, trademarks, and trade names;94 fifteen years for 
patents, copyrights, and computer software acquired with a 
trade or business;95 five years for separately acquired musical 
copyrights;96 and three years for separately acquired computer 
software.97 A fixed recovery period is not prescribed for patents 
and copyrights acquired separately. Instead, the capitalized 
costs of these assets are recovered under one of two 
approaches: (1) over their estimated useful lives under the 
“straight-line method” or (2) as income is actually earned under 
the “income-forecast method” (which has a maximum write-off 
period of eleven years).98  
The consequences of this approach raise policy concerns 
regarding depreciation. For example, a patent acquired as part 
of a business acquisition is subject to ratable fifteen-year 
amortization (which may be shorter or longer than the actual 
useful life of the patent), but a patent acquired separately 
benefits from more rapid depreciation allowances (shorter 
useful life under the straight-line method or accelerated 
allowances under the income-forecast method).99 Is it logical 
that all patents—regardless of type or remaining legal life—
acquired along with a business are grouped into a single 
category with a single recovery method and period, while 
patents acquired separately are depreciated using an asset-by-
  
 94 I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (d)(1)(F) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(5) (as amended in 2008). 
 95 I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (d)(1)(C)(iii) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(5) (as amended in 
2008). 
 96 I.R.C. § 167(g)(8)(A) (2006), amended by Tax Increase Prevention and 
Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222 (providing that a taxpayer may elect to 
ratably deduct the costs of acquiring any musical composition or any copyright with 
respect to musical composition property over a five-year period instead of using the 
income forecast method). 
 97 I.R.C. § 167(f). 
 98 For patents and copyrights acquired outside the context of a business 
acquisition, tax depreciation rules that were applicable prior to 1993 generally 
continue to apply. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3(a) (as amended in 2004), -14(e) (as 
amended in 2006). In 1997, Congress codified the income-forecast method of 
depreciation in Section 167(g) of the Code, providing a maximum recovery period of 
eleven years for income forecast property. I.R.C. § 167(g) (2006), amended by Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-
148, at 514, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 908. Forecasted total income includes all 
income the taxpayer reasonably believes will be earned during the eleven-year period 
beginning with the year the property is placed in service. I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(1)(A), 
(g)(5)(C) (2006). In the eleventh year, a taxpayer may deduct any unrecovered costs left 
in the property. Id. § 167(g)(1)(C). 
 99  See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
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asset approach? If patents derived their value from their 
relationship to a product, service, or goodwill of a business, as 
do trademarks or trade names, it might be justifiable to provide 
an arbitrary recovery period to avoid messy valuation and 
intangible asset allocation problems. However, the value of a 
patent acquired as part of the purchase of a trade or business is 
not necessarily tied to the goodwill of the acquired trade or 
business.100 Rather, patents can be freely sold, assigned, or 
transferred without associated goodwill or other business 
assets.101 The same is true of copyrights and computer-software 
(which is subject to different intellectual property 
protections).102  
As a result, the depreciation schedule for patents, 
copyrights, and software need not necessarily parallel the 
arbitrary depreciation schedule applicable to intangibles 
acquired in a business acquisition, which lack inherent value 
(such as trademarks and trade names). Indeed, an argument 
could be made that, if two patents or two copyrights or two 
types of computer software are capable of reasonable valuation, 
and have relatively similar commercial lives, they should be 
subject to similar tax rules no matter how acquired.103 
  
 100 Trademarks, in part, derive their value from goodwill. See 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 31, §§ 2:18-19 (citing Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 
1940)). The value of patents, however, stems from the owner’s ability to “exclude others 
from making, using, selling, or offering for sale the invention within the United States” 
for a set number of years. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.01 (2010). 
 101 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest 
therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, 
or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive 
right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the 
United States.”); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 
135-36 (1969) (citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891)) (“The law . . . 
recognizes that [the patent holder] may assign to another his patent, in whole or in part, 
and may license others to practice his invention.”). 
 102  A copyright can be transferred separately. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (stating 
that “[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in party by any 
means of conveyance or by operation of law” and that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights 
comprised in a copyright . . . may be transferred . . . and owned separately”) 
Trademarks, in contrast, are accompanied by the business goodwill they represent. See 
Susan M. Richey, The Second Kind of Sin: Making the Case for a Duty to Disclose Facts 
Related to Genericism and Functionality in the Trademark Office, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 137, 167 n.146 (2010) (“The Lanham Act prohibits assignments in gross, requiring 
that purchase of a trademark be accompanied by the business goodwill that it 
represents, and, in the event that a transfer violates the rule, the assignment is void.”).  
 103 Tax inequities with respect to software purchases are even more evident in 
light of the artificially short recovery period for separately acquired software. While 
software acquired as part of the acquisition of a business is depreciated over fifteen 
years, software acquired separately is depreciated over three years—a substantial tax 
benefit to those taxpayers who can navigate the system and negotiate for separate 
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Another example of tax inequity under depreciation 
rules for intellectual property acquisitions relates to the 
treatment of contingent payments. Contingent payments made 
for patents and copyrights acquired with a business are treated 
differently from contingent payments made for patents and 
copyrights acquired separately. If a contingent payment is 
made for a patent acquired with a business, the contingent 
amount is written off over a fifteen-year period.104 If, on the 
other hand, a contingent payment is made for a patent 
acquired separately, the contingent amount is fully deductible 
in the year paid.105 The apparent rationale behind permitting 
this immediate deduction for separately acquired patents is 
that each payment reflects the annual cost of the patent and 
that a current deduction properly matches expenses with 
income.106 However, the same policy can support current 
deductions for all contingent payments, regardless of whether 
the patent is acquired separately or with a trade or business. 
Any concerns about valuing intangibles acquired in a business 
acquisition or about allocating the purchase price among 
acquired intangibles should be nonexistent when contingent 
payments are involved. 
  
purchases of software. Compare I.R.C. §§ 197(a)-(b), (e)(3) (2006) (providing fifteen-year 
recovery period) with id. § 167(f)(1) (providing three-year recovery period).  
 104 Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(f)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008). According to the 
legislative history:  
[I]f a portion of the cost of acquiring an amortizable section 197 intangible is 
contingent, the adjusted basis of the section 197 intangible is to be increased 
as of the beginning of the month that the contingent amount is paid or 
incurred. This additional amount is to be amortized ratably over the 
remaining months in the . . . amortization period that applies to the 
intangible as of the beginning of the month that the contingent amount is 
paid or incurred. 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-213, at 685 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1374. 
 105 Under this approach, known as the “variable contingent payment” method 
of depreciation, a taxpayer adds the amount of the contingent payments to the basis of 
the patent and then immediately takes a depreciation deduction for an equal amount. 
The government has sanctioned the variable contingent payment method. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(c)(4) (as amended in 2006); see also Associated Patentees, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 4 T.C. 979, 985-87 (1945), acq., 1959-2 C.B. 3 (sanctioning deduction for 
variable contingent payments); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1218 (1975) (recognizing that deducting yearly payments on a patent is a 
reasonable method of depreciation); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58 (following the 
Associated Patentees decision). 
 106 Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. at 986 (concluding that a current deduction for 
the entire contingent payment gives the taxpayer “a reasonable, and not more than a 
reasonable,” depreciation allowance, whereas permitting as depreciation only a 
proportionate part of the payment “might deny petitioner the recovery of its cost and 
would unquestionably result in a distortion of income”). 
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C. Inequities in the Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property 
Transfers 
Like the tax treatment of acquisition costs, the tax 
treatment of intellectual property transfers raises a number of 
equity concerns. Consider the following example involving the 
assignment of two patents. Individual A, a freelance inventor, 
sells one of his many developed patents to a third party for 
$100,000. XYZ, Inc., a small research company whose 
employees conduct research, sells one of its many developed 
patents to a third party for $100,000. Although one would 
expect the tax system to treat Individual A and XYZ, Inc. 
similarly, that is not the case. Individual A’s gain will be 
treated as capital gain under the Code’s safe-harbor provision 
in Section 1235;107 XYZ, Inc.’s gain, on the other hand, will be 
treated as ordinary income under the Code’s general 
provisions.108 Section 1235 requires that the transferor is a 
statutorily defined “holder” of the patent—i.e., any individual 
whose personal efforts created the patent property—to be 
guaranteed capital-gains treatment.109 So, here, Individual A 
can qualify for capital-gains treatment under Section 1235 
even though the subject of the sale (i.e., the inventory being 
sold) is not considered a capital asset under general 
characterization principles.110 XYZ, Inc.’s assignment, however, 
will not qualify for Section-1235 treatment, but will instead be 
treated as a sale of a noncapital asset yielding ordinary 
income.111 
  
 107 I.R.C. § 1235 (2006). 
 108 Id. §§ 1222 (requiring the sale or exchange of a “capital asset” for 
preferential capital-gains treatment), 1221(a)(1) (excluding inventory from the capital 
asset definition), 1231(b) (excluding inventory from the quasi-capital asset definition). 
 109 Id. §§ 1235(a), (b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1980). 
More specifically, the regulations provide that a holder is any individual whose efforts 
created the patented property and who would qualify as the “original and first” 
inventor, or joint inventor, under the patent laws. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) 
(referring to Title 35 of the U.S. Code). An inventor’s employer would not qualify as a 
holder “even though he may be the equitable owner of the patent by virtue of an 
employment relationship with the inventor.” S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 423 (1954) 
(Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 50883. 
 110 I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2006) (excluding from capital asset definition inventory 
and inventory-like property). 
 111 Although corporations do not get lower rates on their capital gains, capital 
gains can be used by a corporation to absorb capital losses the corporation may have. 
See id. § 1211(a) (providing that a corporation’s capital losses are allowed only to the 
extent of the corporation’s capital gains). 
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Similar distinctions apply to copyright assignments. For 
example, songwriters are subject to capital-gains tax rates on 
the sales of their songs rather than higher personal income tax 
rates as a result of a special Code provision enacted in 2006 
governing musical compositions and the copyrights thereon.112 
Peculiarly, capital-gains treatment is not available to other 
individual artists, such as novelists, painters, sculptors, and 
designers.113 Moreover, although individual copyright creators 
have ordinary gain on the sale of their works (with the 
exception of musical copyrights, as noted), corporate copyright 
creators are eligible for capital gains on the sale of works 
created by their employees and individual contractors.114 This 
additional distinction results from the fact that the capital-
asset exception for self-created property does not apply to non-
individual creators, such as corporations, whose employees or 
independent contractors created the copyrights.115 These 
distinctions lack any theoretical justification. 
Current charitable deduction rules for intellectual 
property donations also raise equity concerns. These deduction 
rules favor income-generating intellectual property over non-
income-generating intellectual property.116 Moreover, they favor 
donors that give income-generating intellectual property to 
commercially-driven charities over donors that give similar 
property to non-commercially-driven charities.117 Consider two 
corporations planning to donate similar technologies with equal 
values. ABC Company makes a donation to a large university 
that will use the intellectual property in ways that directly 
generate income. XYZ Company, however, makes its donation 
to a small college that emphasizes education and basic 
research. Prior to 2004, the Code granted both companies an 
initial tax deduction for the same amount—the fair-market 
  
 112 Id. § 1221(b)(3). 
 113 Section 1221(b)(3) applies only to musical compositions and copyrights 
thereon. Id. Individual artists, such as novelists, painters, sculptors, and designers are 
subject to the general capital-gains provisions. See id. §§ 1221(a)(3) (excluding from 
capital asset definition self-created copyrighted works), 1231(b)(1)(C) (excluding from 
the definition of Section 1231 property self-created copyrighted works). 
 114 Id. §§ 1221-1222. 
 115 See Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, superseded by Rev. Rul. 62-141, 
1962-2 C.B. 181 (applying inventory exclusion, but not copyright exclusion, suggesting 
that the copyright exclusion does not apply to works-for-hire creations); see also Desilu 
Prods., Inc. v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (1965) (same). 
 116  For discussion of these charitable deduction rules, see infra notes 119-20 
and accompanying text. 
 117  See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
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value of the donated property.118 As amended, the Code does not 
grant either company a fair-market value deduction in the year 
of the gift.119 The Code, however, does give ABC Company 
future charitable tax deductions equal to a certain percentage 
of the royalty income earned by its chosen donee, the 
commercially driven university.120 Because the small college’s 
utilization of XYZ Company’s donated intellectual property will 
not directly generate income, XYZ receives no tax benefit for its 
charitable giving. In practice, then, charitable deduction rules 
favor intellectual property used in applied research over that 
used for fundamental or purely scientific research, and favor 
donors who give to donees with the physical facilities, financial 
resources, and personnel capability to exploit intellectual 
  
 118 Since 1917, the government has provided a financial incentive for 
taxpayers to transfer property to charities by giving taxpayers an immediate tax 
deduction for their donations. See War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 
§ 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (allowing a charitable tax deduction for contributions by 
individuals); Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170 (2006)) (allowing a charitable tax deduction for 
contributions by corporations).  
  Historically, the amount of the taxpayer’s charitable contribution 
deduction was the fair market value of the property contributed. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-
260, 1958-1 C.B. 126 (“The fair market value of an undivided present interest in a 
patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an organization described in 
Section 170(c) . . . constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitable contribution, to 
the extent provided in Section 170, in the taxable year in which such property was 
contributed.”); H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 
1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated property to charity was 
allowed deduction for fair market value of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (as 
amended in 2008) (“If a charitable contribution is made in property other than money, 
the amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of 
the contribution reduced as provided in section 170(e)(1) . . . .”). The government 
defined “fair market value” as “the price at which the property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to 
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.” Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008). The government, however, never fully 
articulated or formalized a standard or approach for determining the fair market value 
of donated intellectual property. 
 119 In 2004, in a drastic and hasty move, Congress amended the charitable 
deduction provision by eliminating the fair market value standard for contributions of 
most all forms of intellectual property, reducing the initial amount a donor may deduct. 
See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (2006), amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. The 2004 legislation limits the initial charitable 
deduction of any type of intellectual property to the property’s tax basis. Often, the 
donor’s tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in many cases, the donor’s basis 
is zero because developments costs are often deducted when incurred. 
 120 To encourage charitable giving of intellectual property, Congress deemed it 
appropriate to grant donors of intellectual property future charitable deductions based on 
the income received by the donee charity. I.R.C. § 170(m)(3) (2006). Specifically, the donor 
can take a deduction for up to ten years for gifts of royalty-producing intellectual property 
to public charities. The amount of the charitable deduction is a percentage of the royalty 
income earned by the donee. The percentage declines over time. Id. §§ 170(m)(1), (7). 
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property solely for direct financial results—a result that 
violates notions of fairness.121 
In sum, numerous tax inequities exist for intellectual 
property developers, acquirers, and transferors. Many of these 
inequities encourage taxpayers to plan transactions that 
minimize taxes. If a taxpayer identifies a business’s patent that 
it would like to purchase for contingent payments, the taxpayer 
receives greater immediate tax deductions if it can negotiate 
the purchase of the patent separately from the seller’s other 
business assets.122 A taxpayer planning to donate income-
generating intellectual property to a charity will receive larger 
tax deductions if it donates the property to a donee that can 
use the intellectual property in ways that will directly generate 
income, rather than a non-commercially-driven donee.123 These 
decisions should be tax-neutral. But under the present tax 
regime, they are not.124  
III.  EXPLORING EFFICIENCY IN THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM  
In addition to fairness concerns, an income tax system 
governing intellectual property should embrace the principle of 
efficiency.125 In tax theory, efficiency means various things in 
various contexts.126 A tax system can be evaluated in terms of 
the extent to which it promotes or hinders economic growth; it 
is efficient when it promotes economic growth and inefficient 
when it stifles beneficial economic behavior.127 In addition to 
promoting economic efficiency, a tax system can also be judged 
in terms of administrative efficiency—namely, the extent to 
which it minimizes taxpayer compliance and government 
enforcement costs.128 Thus, the current intellectual property 
  
 121 See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual 
Property, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1721 (2006). 
 122 As previously noted, the treatment of contingent payments for patents 
acquired separately (current deduction) is more generous than the treatment of 
contingent payments for patents that are acquired with a trade or business (deferral 
and amortization over fifteen years). See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
 123 Charitable tax deductions (beginning with the donation year) equal a 
percentage of income generated by the donated intellectual property. See supra note 120. 
 124 See supra notes 104-06, 116-21 and accompanying text. 
 125 See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
 126 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 127 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
 128 See Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987); Yorio, supra note 18, at 1256-57. 
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taxation system should be analyzed in terms of both economic 
and administrative efficiency. The current taxation policies 
applicable to the development and transfer of new technology 
provide an excellent example of the inefficiencies in the 
existing regime. 
A.  Limits of Current Incentives for Technology Development 
The Internal Revenue Code contains certain provisions 
designed to promote economic growth and improve the 
competiveness of U.S. businesses by encouraging research and 
development.129 These provisions provide a tax deduction and a 
tax credit for certain technology development costs.130 They are 
also intended to reduce uncertainty and complexity 
encountered when applying general tax rules to intellectual 
property transactions. In practice, however, these tax 
incentives have been an inadequate method of realizing their 
underlying goals.  
Section 174131 provides a deduction for research 
expenditures.132 Since this deduction applies only to inventors 
who use, or intend to use, their research results in a trade or 
  
 129  For a discussion and critique of these Code provisions, see infra notes 131-
47 and accompanying text.  
 130 Section 174 was enacted to encourage research activity and stimulate 
economic growth and technological development. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954), 
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4053; 100 CONG. REC. 3425 (1954) (statement of 
Chairman Reed: “This provision will greatly stimulate the search for new products and 
new inventions upon which the future economics and military strength of our Nation 
depends. It will be particularly valuable to small and growing businesses.”); see also 
Donald C. Alexander, Research and Experimental Expenditures Under the 1954 Code, 
10 TAX L. REV. 549 (1955) (noting that a primary reason for enacting Section 174 was 
to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal subsidy of 
research and development startups); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research 
and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 349 (1987) (explaining 
that Congress decided “to provide taxpayers with the option of an immediate 
deduction” in order “to encourage new [research and development]”); Richard L. 
Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and 
High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV. 625, 694 (1990) (“The deduction 
election under section 174(a) is intended to encourage research and development 
activities by allowing the cost of such activities to be used to offset the income earned 
in the business at the earliest possible date.”). 
  Section 41 was enacted to encourage firms to increase their research 
expenditures over time. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 
§ 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 41 (2006)). The credit is 
incremental in that it is equal to a certain percentage of qualified research spending 
above a base amount, id., which can be thought of as a firm’s normal level of research 
and development investment. 
 131 I.R.C. § 174 (2006).  
 132 Id.  
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business,133 it probably does not cover the inventor who merely 
intends to license the results of her inventive activities for 
taxable income.134 In today’s innovation marketplace, however, 
very few individual inventors, startup companies, and young 
research entities develop their innovations into end products or 
services for commercial exploitation.135 Instead, most plan to 
sell or license their innovations to larger companies looking to 
acquire innovations to supplement their own research or build 
promising intellectual property portfolios.136 To achieve optimal 
research outcomes and their concomitant economic benefits, 
then, tax law should recognize and adequately incentivize 
efforts by individual inventors, startups, and the like—
regardless of whether their motives are to use research results 
in a trade or business, or simply to license research results. 
Parallel to Section 174’s research deduction, the Code 
provides a 20% research credit under Section 41.137 The Section 
41 credit, like the deduction, is inadequate. The credit applies 
only to qualified research expenditures in excess of a base 
amount that is a “fixed-base percentage” of the taxpayer’s 
“average annual gross receipts” for the four preceding tax 
years.138 For established firms, the fixed-base percentage is the 
ratio of the taxpayer’s qualified research expenses to its gross 
receipts for years 1984 to 1988, capped at 16%.139 For startup 
firms, the fixed-base percentage is set at 3% during the firm’s 
first five tax years, with spending on qualified research and 
gross receipts; thereafter, the percentage is gradually adjusted 
to reflect the firm’s actual experience, so that by its eleventh 
  
 133 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
 134 A few courts, however, have found a trade or business of inventing and 
permitted deductions. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 135 Reasons for not fully developing innovations may include cost, expertise, 
facility restrictions, business environment, and personnel concerns. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Thaw, Writely Puts Google in Word-Processing Business, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER 
(Mar. 10, 2006), http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/262443_googlewritely10.html 
(reporting the acquisition of a software startup company by Google). 
 136 If an inventor cannot self-develop certain innovations, it looks to others to 
acquire the innovations. Generally, companies acquire innovations for purposes of 
further development and production of products and services with the desire to expand 
or to capture additional market shares. See, e.g., Ben Elgin, Google Buys Android for 
Its Mobile Arsenal, BUS. WK. (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
technology/content/aug2005/tc20050817_0949_tc024.htm (stating that Google acquired 
the twenty-two-month-old startup for its “talented engineers and great technology” 
with “tremendous potential in developing smarter mobile devices that are more aware 
of its owner’s location and preferences”). 
 137 I.R.C. § 41 (2006).  
 138 Id. §§ 41(a), (c)(1). 
 139 Id. §§ 41(c)(3)(A), (C). 
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year, the percentage equals the firm’s total qualified research 
expenses relative to its total receipts for the fifth through tenth 
tax years.140 The base amount may not be less than 50% of the 
qualified research expenses for the credit year.141 
Although Section 41 was designed to encourage 
additional private sector investment in research and 
development,142 as structured, the Section 41 credit fails to 
achieve optimal technology results for a number of reasons. 
First, the credit’s reformulation over the years has limited the 
types of research for which the credit is available. Indeed, not 
all expenditures that qualify for the research deduction under 
Section 174 qualify for the research credit under Section 41, 
due to the latter’s special requirements and exceptions. For 
example, to meet the definitional requirements of “qualified 
research,” substantially all research activities must constitute 
elements of a “process of experimentation” related to a 
qualified purpose.143 The “process of experimentation” 
requirement narrows the definition of the term “qualified 
research”; indeed, the requirements for a process of 
experimentation under Section 41 continue to be more 
stringent than the requirements for research and development 
in the experimental or laboratory sense under Section 174.144 
  
 140 Id. § 41(c)(3)(B). For illustrations of the credit computation, see GARY 
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SER., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS 
AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6-17 (2008). 
 141 I.R.C. § 41(c)(2). Taxpayers may, at their election, compute the research 
credit under another method—the alternative simplified credit method. Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006 § 104, I.R.C. § 41(c)(5) (2006). The alternative simplified credit 
method is an amount equal to 14 percent of the amount by which “the qualified 
research expenses . . . exceed[] 50 percent of the average qualified research expenses 
for the [three preceding] taxable years . . . .” I.R.C. § 41(c)(5)(A) (2006). For taxpayers 
with no qualified research expenses for the three preceding years, the amount of the 
alternative simplified credit is “equal to 6 percent of the qualified research expenses for 
the [current] taxable year.” Id. § 41(c)(5)(B). 
 142 Studies have shown that the credit has led to increased research spending. 
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
(2007); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-89-114, THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS 
STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING (1989). 
 143 I.R.C. § 41(d)(1) (2006). 
 144 See 69 Fed. Reg. 22, 24 (Jan. 2, 2004) (“[M]erely demonstrating that 
uncertainty has been eliminated . . . is insufficient to satisfy the process of 
experimentation requirement. A taxpayer bears the burden of demonstrating that its 
research activities additionally satisfy the process of experimentation requirement.”); see 
also Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(5)(i) (as amended in 2004) (“[A] process of experimentation is 
a process designed to evaluate one or more alternatives to achieve a result where the 
capability or the method of achieving that result, or the appropriate design of that result, 
is uncertain as of the beginning of the taxpayer’s research activities.”). 
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Second, the incremental nature of the credit means that 
many businesses cannot utilize it at all. This could be the case, 
for example, if a company’s gross sales grew faster than its 
qualified research spending. Calculating today’s credit based 
on research spending relative to receipts in the years 1984 to 
1988 does not reflect realities of today’s economic and 
technological world, and it could penalize a company that had 
high research spending levels during the 1984 to 1988 base 
period (unless the alternative formula provided a benefit).145  
Third, the nonpermanent nature of the credit makes it 
difficult for firms to plan ahead for research activities. The 
credit is only temporary and has been extended numerous 
times by Congress. In fact, since its enactment in 1981, the 
credit has been extended more than a dozen times, sometimes 
retroactively after expiration.146 Efforts to make the credit 
permanent have failed due to revenue concerns.147 So, every 
credit renewal year, the government must balance its desire to 
maximize tax revenue without stifling beneficial research and 
development activity. 
B.  Limits of Current Incentives for Technology Transfers 
Under the current system, tax incentives for research 
are limited to the innovation-development market.148 In recent 
years, however, there has been a major shift in the innovation-
development market toward a segmentation model. Small 
companies and research universities now serve as epicenters of 
ideas, complementing and maximizing the innovations of large 
established firms with strong marketing and distribution 
forces.149 The desirable transfers of innovation between 
segments can be either supported or hindered by the income 
  
 145 See supra note 141 (describing the alternative simplified credit method). 
 146 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 41(h)(1)(B) (2006). 
 147 A one-year extension of the credit, for example, was estimated to cost the 
government almost $9 billion over ten years. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH 
CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 6049, at 4 (Comm. Print 2008), available 
at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1293. 
 148 See I.R.C. §§ 41 (providing limited tax credit for qualified research 
expenses), 174 (providing current tax deduction for research and experimental 
expenditures), 1235 (guaranteeing preferential capital-gains rate treatment for certain 
inventors). 
 149 See generally Michael J. Kennedy, Technology and Emerging Growth 
Acquisitions: The Private Perspective, in HANDLING HIGH-TECH M&AS IN A COOLING 
MARKET: ENSURING THAT YOU GET VALUE 921, 923-25 (Practising Law Institute, 2001) 
(discussing the flexibility associated with deals between private and public companies). 
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tax system. Favorable tax rules governing assignments to 
private market acquirers and donations to public charities 
could serve to encourage transfers to the right acquirers for 
further research, product development, or licensing—thereby 
increasing economic growth.150 Here, again, the tax rules could 
also facilitate administrative efficiency by removing 
unnecessary complexity in their application. This type of tax 
scheme would support the business and technology realities of 
today’s innovation segmentation, allow new ideas to develop at 
a faster pace, and foster strong competition. The current tax 
system, however, is not designed as such. Currently, there are 
inefficiencies in the tax scheme covering both private market 
transactions and charitable donations of technology. 
1. Private-Market Transactions 
With respect to private-market transactions, the income 
tax system could be used to create incentives for transferors or 
transferees—or both. Presently, few transferors are guaranteed 
preferential capital-gains treatment on the assignment of their 
inventions.151 Section 1235 of the Code guarantees capital-gains 
treatment only to individuals—i.e., the original inventors that 
assign all substantial rights to their inventions;152 it does not 
apply to the more common startup companies and small 
research entities whose employees conduct their research.153 As 
a result, these developers must apply general tax rules to 
determine the character of their gains, and these gains are 
often characterized as ordinary income, especially if the firm 
has sold a number of inventions over the years.154  
  
 150  For an argument that greater tax incentives for purchasers of intellectual 
property may encourage desirable transfers of intellectual property, see infra notes 
155-78 and accompanying text. For an argument that revised charitable deduction 
rules may encourage desirable donations of intellectual property, see infra notes 179-84 
and accompanying text. 
 151 See I.R.C. § 1235 (2006). 
 152 Section 1235 guarantees capital-gains rates, as opposed to higher ordinary 
income tax rates, for any transfer of all substantial rights to a patent by certain holders 
to unrelated parties. Id. § 1235(a). “[A]ny individual whose efforts created such 
property” qualifies as a “holder” for purposes of Section 1235. Id. § 1235(b)(1).  
 153 Although Section 1235 does not apply to companies, “each member of a 
partnership who is an individual[, however,] may qualify as a holder as to his [pro-
rata] share of a patent owned by the partnership.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(2) (as 
amended in 1980).  
 154 I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1231(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (precluding inventory and 
inventory-type property from qualifying for capital-gains treatment). Although 
corporations do not enjoy lower rates on capital gains, capital gains can be used to 
offset capital losses the corporation may have. Id. § 1211(a) (“In the case of a 
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Likewise, transferees of high technology receive few 
breaks for their acquisition costs under the current regime. 
Without exception, purchasers of technology are subject to the 
general asset-capitalization rule, which requires them to 
capitalize all costs of acquiring technology.155 This rule, of 
course, raises the costs of products that have a high technology 
content. To remedy this effect, the government could depart 
from the asset-capitalization principle and instead allow 
limited expensing of innovation purchase costs. Although the 
government has never considered doing so, it has, since 1981, 
permitted small business taxpayers to elect to immediately 
deduct the cost of purchasing certain tangible property that 
would otherwise have to be capitalized (e.g., business machines 
and equipment, transportation equipment, and 
communications equipment).156 The extension of this expense 
allowance to certain innovation acquisition costs would 
represent a significant tax subsidy for innovation investment 
and achieve other important goals. Chiefly, it would lower the 
cost of capital for innovations used in an active trade or 
business, which, in turn, would reduce the tax burden on 
innovation acquirers, and stimulate business investment and 
the economy as a whole. Policymakers had these goals in mind 
when they enacted special expensing provisions for tangible 
property.157 These objectives are equally applicable to intangible 
innovations.  
Moreover, expanding the expense allowance for limited 
acquisition costs would eliminate high administrative costs and 
reduce the harm caused by current irrational tax depreciation 
rules. Some commentators have argued that the capitalization 
of costs is warranted only if followed by rational depreciation 
  
corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the 
extent of gains from such sales or exchanges.”). 
 155 Id. § 263 (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i), -4(c) (2004) (“[A] 
taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to another party to acquire any intangible from 
that party in a purchase or similar transaction.”). 
 156 I.R.C. § 179 (2006). The type of property to which the election applies is 
“section 179 property,” defined generally as tangible, depreciable, personal property—
as opposed to real property—that is acquired for use in the active conduct of a trade or 
business. Id. § 179(d)(1). As a result of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 § 202(c), Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, off-the-shelf 
computer software was added to the list of Section 179 property. 
 157 See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31852, SMALL BUSINESS 
EXPENSING ALLOWANCE: CURRENT STATUS, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, AND ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS 3-5 (2005) (weighing the costs and benefits of expensing for small businesses). 
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rules.158 But the current system is far from rational, supporting 
the argument that capitalization is not necessarily justified for 
all intellectual property acquisition costs. As the authors have 
argued elsewhere, any immediate incentive for acquisition 
costs, such as the expensing option discussed here, should be 
limited to innovations acquired for future development or 
licensing.159 This incentive should not extend to innovations 
acquired for offensive-use purposes because the use of patent 
portfolios to threaten others through litigation actually 
hinders, rather than promotes, innovation.160 
As an alternative to allowing an expense option for 
certain innovation acquisitions, the government could design 
more rational tax depreciation rules that would incentivize 
desirable innovation acquisitions. When designing new ex ante 
depreciation rules, a decision would have to be made about 
whether to establish a grouping system for innovations (the 
current approach for all tangible property161 and intangible 
property acquired with a business162) or an asset-by-asset 
system (the current approach for intangible property acquired 
separately)163. A grouping system would achieve greater 
administrative efficiency than an asset-by-asset depreciation 
system and, if designed properly, could also support a strong 
acquisition market. Under a grouping system, intellectual 
property could be grouped into classes with arbitrary recovery 
periods for each class. This approach would alleviate some of 
the problems caused by both the asset-by-asset approach—
namely, the burden of having to determine the useful life of 
separately acquired intellectual property—and the income-
forecast method. 
In selecting an appropriate recovery period for various 
classes of intellectual property, the government could make an 
effort to achieve some correlation between the prescribed 
groupings and the actual economic useful lives of intellectual 
  
 158 See Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. 
REV. 549, 557-64 (2004) (arguing that flawed depreciation schedules may justify 
departure from normative capitalization but only in limited cases; otherwise, expensing 
may be a preferable neutrality-enhancing policy choice). 
 159 Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation, supra note 4, at 787-92. 
 160 Id. 
 161 I.R.C. § 168(b) (2006) (listing various depreciation methods according to 
type of property). 
 162 Id. § 197; see supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
 163 I.R.C. § 167; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), -14 (as 
amended in 2006); see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
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property. The correlation between tax depreciation and 
economic depreciation would not have to be exact. Indeed, the 
government could design a system that is “accelerated”; many 
of the recovery periods for intellectual property could be 
shorter for tax purposes than for economic purposes. Under an 
accelerated approach, purchasers of intellectual property could 
recover their costs more quickly tax-wise than economic reality 
would dictate. 
It might be tempting to adhere to a fifteen-year recovery 
period—the recovery period for many intangible assets under 
the current scheme (which determines the applicable recovery 
period based on how the intellectual property was acquired).164 
For many intangibles acquired in a business acquisition, the 
recovery period is fifteen years. By contrast, an asset-specific 
approach is used for separately acquired intangibles.165 
Although fifteen years is a short period compared to the 
unlimited lives of trade secrets, trademarks, and trade names, 
it is much longer than the useful lives of many acquired 
patents. The government selected a fifteen-year recovery period 
so that the new legislation would be approximately revenue-
neutral over the first five years.166 While much can be said for 
this current revenue-neutral approach, it is not an ideal 
method of encouraging desirable innovation acquisitions. 
The government should consider creating exemptions 
from the current fifteen-year period for patents, patent 
applications, software, and other high technology intellectual 
property purchased in the acquisition of a trade or business. 
Property of this nature is capable of reasonable valuation and 
has a relatively short commercial life, no matter how it was 
acquired. If technology derived its value from its relationship to 
a product, service, or goodwill of a business (as a trademark or 
trade names does), it might make sense to provide an arbitrary 
fifteen-year recovery period to avoid messy valuation and 
intangible asset-allocation problems. However, high technology 
acquired as part of the purchase of a company does not 
  
 164 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
 165  See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
 166 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., TECHNICAL 
EXPLANATION OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993, at 147 (Comm. Print 1993) 
[hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION], available at http://www.jct.gov/publications. 
html?func=startdown&id=2915 (acknowledging that the asset’s useful life may either 
fall short or exceed the amortization period, but nevertheless establishing such 
amortization period based on the goal of revenue neutrality over the subsequent five 
fiscal years). 
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necessarily derive its value from the goodwill and reputation of 
the business with which it is associated. High technology can 
be freely sold, assigned, or transferred without associated 
goodwill or other business assets.167 Hence, the depreciation 
schedule for technology need not parallel the arbitrary fifteen-
year schedule application to all intangibles acquired in a 
business acquisition, such as trademarks and trade names, 
which lack inherent value. 
With regard to technology—whether acquired 
separately or with a business—short recovery periods, such as 
three or five years, would incentivize investment in innovation 
capital. Short recovery periods would also recognize the 
relatively risky nature of high technology compared to other 
intangible assets. Risk, such as retirement risk and revenue 
risk, “can have a significant impact on the optimal design of 
depreciation rules.”168 As some economists have argued, 
“depreciation schedules for relatively risky assets should be 
accelerated to compensate the owners of such assets for bearing 
a disproportionably large share of the capital price risk.”169 It is 
often difficult to determine whether certain acquired 
technologies will produce benefits and, if they do, how long 
benefits will last. For example, if a purchaser acquires 
technology at an early stage while patent applications for the 
technology are pending, the purchaser cannot be certain that 
all of the patent applications will mature to patents. In 
addition, even after the purchaser receives the patents, there is 
always a fear that the patents may be subsequently invalidated 
by a third party.170 
The government has already provided an artificially low 
recovery period for separately acquired computer software. In 
  
 167  See supra notes 101-02. 
 168 Jeff Strnad, Tax Depreciation and Risk, 52 SMU L. REV. 547, 547 (1999); 
see also id. at 547-48 (“[R]etirement risk must be taken into account in designing an 
accelerated schedule that does not favor some assets over others.”). 
 169 Yale, supra note 158, at 572 (citing Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. 
Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 20, 37-38 (1984); Roger H. 
Gordon & John Douglas Wilson, Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital 
Income, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 427, 438 (1989)). 
 170  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The 
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party 
asserting such invalidity.”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the presumption of validity must be overcome by clear 
and convincing evidence); William Alsup, A District Judge’s Proposal for Patent Reform: 
Revisiting the Clear and Convincing Standard and Calibrating Deference to the Strength 
of the Examination, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1648 (2009) (“[A]t least one-third of 
patent claims asserted in litigation should never have issued.”). 
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1993, Congress created an arbitrary three-year depreciation 
period for capitalized costs of separately acquired software (i.e., 
software that is not acquired as part of the purchase of a trade 
or business).171 This recovery period reduces the cost of, and 
encourages investment in, computer software, allowing U.S. 
firms to compete in the world marketplace. The government 
could extend the three-year recovery period for computer 
software to similar high technology intellectual property, for 
example, advanced formulae, processes, or design patterns.172 
Admittedly, short write-off periods, such as those 
proposed here, run counter to the basic goal of tax 
depreciation—i.e., to measure the decline in the value of 
property due to wear, tear, and obsolescence, and to match the 
cost recovery of the property with the income stream produced 
by the property.173 But this matching goal is difficult to achieve 
and, in recent years, has given way to the desire for tax 
simplification and economic growth.174 In the 1980s, Congress 
created artificially low recovery periods for depreciable tangible 
property (three, five, and seven years in most cases).175 And 
recently, courts have permitted rapid write offs of antique 
tangible property used in a trade or business, even though 
antiques do not have a determinable useful life and usually 
increase in value.176 In 1993, Congress created a fifteen-year 
recovery period for many intangibles, some of which have 
unlimited lives and were before then considered ineligible for 
depreciation allowances.177 These rules increase tax revenue 
loss for the government, but the resulting losses are considered 
outweighed by the benefits of lower efficiency costs and the 
  
 171 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 172 Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearing on S. 1245, H.R. 3035 & H.R. 
4210 Before the Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 160-61 (1992) (statement of the Elec. Indus. 
Ass’n) (arguing a shorter recovery period is warranted for high technology intellectual 
property since such property is very similar to computer software). 
 173 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 908. 
 174  The tax expensing and tax depreciation rules for tangible property are 
prime examples. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (2006) (providing arbitrarily short recovery 
periods for most depreciable tangible personal property); id. § 179 (providing limited 
expensing of the cost of purchasing depreciable tangible personal property). 
 175  Id. §§ 168(c), (e). 
 176 See, e.g., Simon v. Comm’r, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing tax 
depreciation for antique violin bows even though the taxpayers could not demonstrate 
that the bows had a determinable useful life). 
 177  Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 107 Stat. 
312 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 197 (2006)); see supra notes 94-95 and 
accompanying text. 
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potential competitive advantages to be gained by U.S. 
businesses.178 
2. Public Charitable Transfers 
In the current innovation development segmentation 
market, many universities and other not-for-profit 
organizations engage in valuable research activities. An 
efficient tax system should encourage transfers of undeveloped 
innovation to such charitable donees. Historically, the 
charitable tax deduction was a vital tool for transferring 
technology from research corporations to universities and other 
nonprofit donees that could properly exploit the technology.179  
As a result of 2004 legislation aimed at reducing the 
number of negligent and intentional overvaluations of 
intellectual property donations, there is now very little 
immediate economic incentive for charitable donations of any 
type of intellectual property.180 Presently, few technology donors 
receive any immediate tax benefit for their contributions.181 
Donors can take future deductions if the donated intellectual 
property generates income for the charitable donee.182 But 
providing donors with uncertain and declining future economic 
incentives does not adequately encourage intellectual property 
donations. Even if a charitable donee licenses the donated 
  
 178 For early arguments for and against depreciation deductions for 
trademarks and trade names, see Michael J. Dunne & Elizabeth A. Barba, The Tax 
Treatment of Trademarks Gets Renewed Attention in Congress, NAT’L L.J., May 11, 
1992, at S15. 
 179 Large corporations with research and development facilities often develop 
patents that later become “not consistent with [their] core technologies or mission,” that 
are “not appropriate for licensing to third parties,” or that have “no value for defensive 
purposes in competitive markets.” RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. INST., IP DONATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 5 (2004), available at http://s251835929. 
onlinehome.us/reports/IP_Donations_Policy_Review.pdf. For example, Dow Chemical 
reportedly donated 10,000 patents to qualified charitable organizations over a five-year 
period. Id. at 6. 
 180 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
 181  Presently, the initial charitable deduction amount is the lesser of the 
taxpayer’s tax basis in the donated intellectual property or the fair market value of the 
intellectual property at the time of contribution. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (2006). In most 
cases, where intellectual property appreciates in value, the lesser amount is the donor’s 
tax basis. Often the donor’s tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in many 
cases, the donor’s basis is zero because intellectual property development costs are 
often deducted when incurred. See, e.g., id. § 174. 
 182  More specifically, a donor is allowed deductions for a limited number of 
years based on a specified percentage of the qualified donee income “received by or 
accrued to” the charity from the donated property itself, rather than income stemming 
from the activity in which the donated property is used. Id. § 170(m). 
2010] EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN IP TAXATION 39 
intellectual property, the potential future deduction will not be 
substantial enough. It may take the charity several years 
before it receives any financial return on its donated 
intellectual property. While the intellectual property may begin 
generating royalty revenues immediately, under the new law, 
the amount of future charitable deductions declines annually 
on a sliding scale.183 Indeed, in the tenth post-contribution year, 
the donor may deduct only 20% of the income.184 
C.  Administrative Inefficiencies Under Current Intellectual 
Property Tax Regime 
In addition to promoting economic efficiency, the 
general rule is that a good tax system should also be 
administratively efficient; it should provide certainty and 
clarity to minimize costs of compliance and administration. 
Many of the special rules governing intellectual property were 
enacted to reduce uncertainty and complexity encountered 
when applying general tax rules to intellectual property 
transactions. For example, Section 174 reduced uncertainties 
in the application of the asset-capitalization rule to research 
and development expenditures.185 Likewise, Section 1235 
clarified the tax treatment of patent transfers,186 and Section 
  
 183  Id. §§ 170(m)(1), (7). 
 184  Id. § 170(m)(7). 
 185 While one justification for Section 174 was to encourage new research and 
development activity and stimulate economic growth and technological development, 
another justification was “to reduce uncertainty caused by the application of the asset-
capitalization rules to” research and development activities. George Mundstock, 
Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1258-59 (1987); see 
also David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 
85, 88-89 (1991) (explaining that the old capitalization rule was difficult to apply to 
research and development costs). 
 186 While Section 1235 was intended to encourage research and development 
that potentially lead to patentable inventions, it also resulted in reduced uncertainty 
and minimized disputes over the application of general tax principles to patent 
transfers. For example, when applicable, Section 1235 provides statutory assurance 
that a patent transfer will not be deemed a license merely because of the existence of 
contingent payments. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2006) (providing that Section 1235 applies 
regardless of whether the payments received are “(1) payable periodically over a period 
generally coterminous with the transferee’s use of the patent, or (2) contingent on the 
productivity, use, or disposition of the property transferred”); see also S. REP. NO. 83-
1622, at 422 (1954) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (stating 
that Section 1235 was intended “to give statutory assurance to certain patent holders 
that the sale of a patent (whether as an ‘assignment’ or ‘exclusive license’) shall not be 
deemed not to constitute a ‘sale or exchange’ for tax purposes solely on account of the 
mode of payment”).  
  Section 1235 also eliminates uncertainty over whether a patent transferor 
is an amateur (who is eligible for capital-gains treatment under general tax principles) 
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1253 alleviated uncertainties and much litigation regarding the 
tax treatment of trademark and trade name transfers.187 
Section 197, similarly, was enacted “to simplify the rules for 
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of 
controversies arising from the need to determine which 
intangibles are depreciable and what their recovery periods 
should be.”188  
The problem is that few of the special tax rules are 
conclusive; they contain many limitations, ambiguities, and 
exceptions. The consequence is that the tax outcome for many 
intellectual property assets and transactions is determined 
under the general tax rules—the same rules that were the 
initial source of complexity. For example, if Section 174 does 
  
or a professional inventor (who is not eligible for capital-gains treatment under general 
tax principles). H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 85 (1954) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4108; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 112 (1954) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747.  
  Section 1235 also eliminates the need to ascertain the holding period of an 
invention for purposes of meeting the requisite one-year holding period under the general 
capital-gains provisions. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006) (“‘[L]ong-term capital gain’ means gain 
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year . . . .”). 
  If the requirements of Section 1235 are met (i.e., there exists a transfer of 
“all substantial rights” by a “holder” to an “unrelated party,” as those terms are defined 
for purposes of section 1235), then a patent transferor is assured capital-gains 
treatment. Id. § 1235(a). Determinations of what constitutes a “sale” or a “capital 
asset” are made under general sale or exchange principles. See id. §§ 1221, 1222, 1231 
(general capital-gains provisions). 
 187 Prior to the enactment of Section 1253 in 1969, there was confusion over 
the proper tax consequences of trademark and trade name dispositions. In particular, 
there was considerable diversity of opinion among courts over what sorts of interests 
retained by transferors should preclude capital-gains treatment and uncertainty over 
the impact of contingent payments in trademark and trade-name transfers. Congress 
enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 516, I.R.C. § 1235 (2006), to bring clarity to this 
area of the law. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 198 (1969) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2242-43; H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 1815-16 (1964) (Comm. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1815-16. 
  Section 1253 mandates ordinary income treatment on all payments that are 
“contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition” of a trademark or trade name. I.R.C. 
§ 1253(c) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 1253 imposes ordinary income treatment on 
noncontingent payments (whether up-front or installment payments) received for the 
transfer of a trademark or trade name “if the transferor retains any significant power, 
right, or continuing interest with respect to the subject matter” of the mark or name. Id. 
§ 1253(a). The Code sets forth six potentially significant powers, any one of which, if 
retained, would require ordinary income treatment. Id. § 1253(b)(2). This list of retained 
powers is not exhaustive; rather, consideration is given to all the facts and circumstances 
existing at the time of a transfer to determine whether an unenumerated power 
constitutes a significant power. For example, the duration of the relevant restriction is 
important in determining whether the restriction is significant. Stokely USA, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 100 T.C. 439, 453, 456-57 (1993) (finding that a five-year right to disapprove a 
transfer was insignificant, while a twenty-year restriction preventing the transferee from 
using the trademark on certain products was significant). 
 188 Mary LaFrance, Days of Our Lives: The Impact of Section 197 on the Depreciation 
of Copyrights, Patents, and Related Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 320 (1995). 
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not apply, a taxpayer must capitalize the research costs.189 
However, complex questions arise in applying the asset-
capitalization principle to research costs. For example, when do 
research activities result in an identifiable asset? How does one 
apportion the costs if a particular project partly succeeds and 
partly fails, or if different and simultaneous research activities 
contribute in varying degrees to the development of an asset or 
more than one asset? 
Similarly, if Section 1235 does not apply to patent 
assignments, the general sale or exchange principle must be 
applied to determine the tax treatment of a particular 
transfer.190 But difficult-to-answer questions with respect to 
technology—questions that justified adoption of the special 
rule—must be addressed: Does the transfer constitute a sale? 
Is the subject of transfer a capital asset? What is the holding 
period? 
Likewise, if Section 197 does not apply to an intellectual 
property acquisition, tax depreciation allowances are 
determined under the asset-specific approach that applied 
before enactment of the special provision—under the straight-
line or income-forecast method.191 This approach sets up 
unnecessary rule, compliance, and transactional complexity—
raising the question of why there are different depreciation 
methods and different write-off periods for the same type of 
technology that depend solely on the method of technology 
transfer.192  
The new charitable deduction rules applicable to 
technology contributions are a classic example of a recent tax 
law change that was designed to enhance administrative 
efficiency but only increased inefficiency. The new law’s focus 
on future tax deductions imposes heavy administrative 
  
 189  The Section 174 deduction is an exception to the general asset-
capitalization principle of Section 263. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(B) (2006). If Section 174 does 
not apply, the research and development costs must be capitalized. See id. 
 190  Section 1235 is a safe-harbor provision providing all the elements 
necessary for capital-gains treatment. Id. § 1235(a) (providing that a transfer “shall be 
considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year”). If Section 
1235 does not apply (e.g., the transfer does not consist of all substantial rights to a 
patent by a holder), the general capital-gains provisions apply (i.e., capital-gains 
treatment is only available if the transfer constitutes a “sale or exchange of a capital 
asset”). See id. 
 191  When applicable, Section 197 is used to determine cost recovery 
deductions. Id. § 197(b). When inapplicable, general depreciation principles apply. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14 (as amended in 2006). 
 192 Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearing on S. 1245, H.R. 3035 & H.R. 4210 
Before the Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 52 (1992) (statement of William P. Benac). 
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burdens, including modified and expanded record-keeping 
requirements, on both intellectual property donors and 
charitable donees.193 Because the new law allows donors to take 
deductions over a period of years determined based upon the 
income derived from the donated property, the donor and the 
donee organization must communicate with one another and 
with the IRS for several years following a qualified 
contribution.194 By allowing future deductions to be based on 
income received or accrued by the charity from the donated 
property itself, rather than from income stemming from the 
activity in which the donated property is used, the new law 
places the difficult burden on charities of tracking their specific 
intellectual property assets. Moreover, with regard to 
considering future tax deductions at stake under the new law, 
donors will incur substantial monitoring costs. 
IV.  DEVELOPING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY TAXATION  
From an equity and efficiency standpoint, there are 
fundamental flaws in the current intellectual property tax 
regime. These defects can be attributed to the absence of an 
appropriate legal framework for intellectual property tax 
legislation.195 The current regime evolved over time as 
particular concerns arose, but at no time was a framework of 
rational intellectual property and tax policy objectives used in 
developing rules to ensure a sound system.196 The following 
  
 193  Donors must inform charitable donees of their intent to treat the 
contribution as a “qualified intellectual property contribution” and take additional 
deductions in subsequent years based on the income accrued from the donated 
property. I.R.C. § 170(m)(8)(B). Charitable donees must provide donors with written 
substantiations explaining the amount of income derived from the donated intellectual 
property during the tax year. Id. § 6050L(b)-(c). Further, charitable donees must file an 
annual information return reporting their qualified donee income and other specified 
information. Id. 
 194 See id. §§ 170(m)(8)(B), 6050L(b)-(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6050L-2 (2008). 
 195  The Code contains several special rules that govern different types of 
intellectual property. A few of the special provisions apply equally to a large group of 
intellectual property assets. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(6), 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), 170(m), 197 
(2006). Most, however, are mutually exclusive, governing specific forms of intellectual 
property. See, e.g., id. §§ 41, 167(f)(1), 167(g)(8), 174, 1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, 1253. 
Some of these special provisions encourage certain intellectual property activities; 
some close tax loopholes and remove perceived tax inequities; and some simplify rules 
and eliminate tax uncertainties that existed under general tax principles. None were 
enacted within a framework of rational intellectual property and tax policy objectives, 
as suggested later in this article. 
 196  See supra note 195. 
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questions illustrate some important considerations that could 
help shape an appropriate framework for intellectual property 
tax legislation. To what extent, if any, should the tax system 
support the intellectual property system? And to what extent, if 
any, should the tax system adopt distinctions among 
intellectual property rights? If tax distinctions are adopted, 
what is a rational basis for making coherent tax distinctions?  
A.  Establishing the Role of the Tax System in Supporting 
the Intellectual Property System 
Inefficiencies in the intellectual property tax regime 
may or may not be justified, depending on one’s view of 
whether the tax system should support the intellectual 
property system. As discussed above, the special tax provisions 
designed to incentivize innovation197 have, in practice, failed to 
achieve this goal.198 In addition, these special tax rules apply 
only to the development of patents and patent-like property; 
they do not extend to other types of intellectual property 
creation, such as copyrights and trademarks.199 This tax policy 
might be deemed efficient if one adopts a narrow view of the 
overall social and economic benefits derived from intellectual 
property,200 but under a broader view of intellectual property’s 
positive effects, it might be deemed inefficient. To make this 
determination, an appropriate legal framework for intellectual 
property tax rules would consider the extent to which 
harmonization between the intellectual property and taxation 
schemes should be achieved. Specifically, what role should the 
tax system play, if any, in promoting the intellectual property 
system? 
Few people would disagree that encouraging inventions 
and works of authorship is critical to U.S. economic growth. 
When the Founding Fathers included the Patent and Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution,201 their words clearly conveyed the 
  
 197 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 41 (2006) (credit for limited research expenditures); id. 
§ 174 (deduction for limited research expenditures); id. § 1235 (capital-gains treatment 
for limited assignments of innovations in the form of patents). 
 198 See supra notes 131-47 and accompanying text. 
 199  See, e.g., infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text. 
 200 It might be deemed efficient if one accepts a meaning of tax efficiency other 
than the one used here. Indeed, some might argue that the “efficiency criterion 
requires that a tax interfere as little as possible with people’s economic behavior.” 
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29 (summarizing several different meanings of 
tax efficiency); see also supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
 201 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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objective of rewarding inventors with exclusive rights in their 
inventions.202 The Founding Fathers believed that a reward-
based system would “promote the Progress of Science.”203 At the 
same time, they also understood that unfettered rights would 
not aid scientific progress and therefore placed a time limit on 
the exclusivity for patents.204 The patent statute and its 
subsequent amendments take a similar view.205 For an 
invention to be granted a patent, it must be, among other 
  
 202 See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533-34 (1871) (“Letters 
patent are not to be regarded as monopolies . . . but as public franchises granted to the 
inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to them, as such 
inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to 
make and use and vend to others to be used their own inventions, as tending to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to 
the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and reducing 
the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and 
sanctioned by the laws of Congress.”). 
 203 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 
63 (1998) (“The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and 
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the 
interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has 
been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.”). 
 204 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 
(1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage 
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any 
concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (“Patents are not given as favors . . . but are 
meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a 
term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.”).  
  As demonstrated in Thomas Jefferson’s writings—which played an 
influential role in shaping modern patent law—patent grants should only be issued by 
the government to truly warranted inventions. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas 
City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (After a review of Thomas Jefferson’s writings and his 
influences on shaping the patent system, the Court concluded, “Jefferson did not 
believe in granting patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous 
devices. His writings evidence his insistence upon a high level of patentability.”); see 
also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148 (“Today’s patent statute is remarkably similar to the 
law as known to Jefferson in 1793. Protection is offered to ‘whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006))). 
 205 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (defining the categories of patentable invention broadly 
to include “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or . . . improvement thereof”); id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . , 
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . .”). 
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things, novel and nonobvious;206 in other words, patents are 
granted for innovation.207 
Similarly, trade secret law was designed to foster 
innovation and promote responsible business conduct.208 To that 
end, trade secrets are treated as property, and courts have thus 
held that regulations forcing trade secret disclosure amount to 
a governmental taking of property for which the trade secret 
owner must be justly compensated.209 Moreover, the law 
  
 206 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (“Granting 
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real 
innovation retards progress and may, for patents combining previously known 
elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”). 
 207 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the 
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting 
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation.”); Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a 
careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that 
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and 
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”). 
 208 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The 
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are 
the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”). The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that, with respect to innovations not eligible for patent protection, “[t]rade 
secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will 
prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his 
invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, 
if not quite patentable, invention.” Id. at 485. The Kewanee Oil Court also 
acknowledged “the importance of trade secret protection to the subsidization of 
research and development and to increased economic efficiency within large companies 
through the dispersion of responsibilities for creative developments.” Id. at 482 (citing 
Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (“[T]he protection of trade secrets has been 
justified as a means to encourage investment in research by providing an opportunity 
to capture the returns from successful innovations.”). Not surprisingly, commentators 
have had their disagreements on the justifications of trade secret protections. See, e.g., 
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 391 (2008) (asserting that “the goal of trade 
secret law is not to encourage the production of . . . information so much as the 
production of . . . business”); Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade 
Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 314 (2008) (“Understanding trade 
secrets . . . as imposing a consistent set of standards on claims that would otherwise be 
based on disparate legal theories and claims of entitlement or free riding—advances 
the goals of innovation and promotes responsible business conduct without limiting the 
vigorous competition on which a market economy is based.”); Michael Risch, Why Do 
We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 26 (2007) (“[C]reating 
incentives to innovate is a very minor justification of trade secret law.”). 
 209 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984); 
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 46 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that state 
regulation requiring disclosure of the content of cigarettes was a taking of trade 
secrets); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl. 
1961) (upholding takings claim); DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14 
(Cal. 2003) (holding that trade secrets represent a “constitutionally recognized property 
interest in [information]”); 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE 
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prohibits the unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets by 
private parties; indeed, most states have statutes on the 
misappropriation of trade secrets.210 
Tracking the goals of intellectual property laws, the 
current tax regime governing patents and patent-like property 
was designed, although not optimally, to promote innovation 
through various tax incentives (i.e., a research tax credit, a 
current deduction for research expenditures, and reduced 
capital-gains tax on patent assignments).211 The more complex 
question, however, is the extent to which tax laws should 
encourage other intellectual property activities. At first glance, 
it is arguable that the current tax regime does not adequately 
promote the goals of other types of intellectual property, such 
as copyrights and trademarks—that it actually hinders those 
goals. A closer look, however, reveals that most, if not all, 
intellectual property rights (not just patents) achieve the same 
objectives: innovation and/or efficiency. Patent and copyright 
laws in general—and, to a lesser extent, trade secret laws—
focus on innovation.212 Trademark laws target efficiency in the 
marketplace for both the producer and consumer of a 
trademarked product or service.213 Given these similar 
objectives, the disparate tax treatment of different types of 
intellectual property is hard to justify. 
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to promote 
the progress of both science and the useful arts, and as a 
consequence, Congress has granted significant protections for 
both patents and copyrights with “all that means for the social 
and economic benefits.”214 The intellectual property system 
encourages innovation by rewarding both inventors and 
authors with exclusive rights in their inventions and works of 
authorship for a limited time.215 Patentees and copyright owners 
  
SECRETS § 2.01[2], at 21 (2010) (“Practically all jurisdictions have recognized that a 
trade secret is property,” at least in certain senses.). 
 210 See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 
19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 772-75 (2009) (discussing state 
statutes on trade secrets). 
 211  See supra notes 130-47, 151-54 and accompanying text. 
 212  See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text. 
 213  See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. 
 214 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“The subject-matter 
provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional 
and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all 
that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”). 
 215 Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833) (“The patent law was 
designed for the public benefit, as well as for the benefit of inventors. For a valuable 
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can exploit their intellectual property rights for economic 
gain.216 The public benefits greatly from the innovations, as 
more inventors and authors create more programs and 
technologies that transform every industry, from biotechnology 
to communications and entertainment.217 Furthermore, even 
after a patent or copyright expires, the patent or copyright 
becomes part of the public domain; at that point, the public is 
free to use the knowledge embodied in the expired patent or to 
copy and distribute the works.218 With these similarities in goals 
and substantive protections,219 one would expect the tax system 
to treat patents and copyrights similarly. This has never been 
the case. 
Although substantive copyright laws serve to encourage 
creative genius and the release of the products of creative 
genius to the public, the current tax system is not aligned with 
this objective. A tax credit, while available for patent 
development costs, does not exist for copyright creation 
expenditures.220 Tax deduction rules do not adequately 
incentivize creation activities, generally requiring the 
capitalization of copyright creation costs.221 Moreover, tax rules 
governing copyright assignments are quite harsh. Indeed, since 
1950, Congress has prevented individual copyright creators 
from receiving capital-gains treatment upon the sales of their 
copyrights.222 Conversely, patent developers were not covered by 
  
invention, the public, on the inventor’s complying with certain conditions, give him, for 
a limited period, the profits arising from the sale of the thing invented. This holds out 
an inducement for the exercise of [genius] and skill in making discoveries which may 
be useful to society, and profitable to the discoverer.”); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964). 
 216 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies 
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
 217 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 218 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative 
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation of useful 
works] for the general public good.”). 
 219 See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. 
 220  The research tax credit applies only to expenses incurred in the 
experimental or laboratory sense, and it does not apply to research conducted in the 
“social sciences, arts, or humanities.” I.R.C. § 41(d) (2006). 
 221 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 222 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 932-33 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3) (2006)). 
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the 1950 legislation and, to this day, may be eligible for capital-
gains treatment upon the sales of their patents.223 Finally, 
although all intellectual property donors now receive an initial 
charitable deduction equal to the donor’s tax basis, between 
1969 and 2004, patent donors (but not copyright donors) 
received an initial deduction equal to the property’s fair market 
value at the time of contribution.224 An appropriate legal 
framework for intellectual property taxation would consider 
harmonization between the copyright system and the tax 
system. 
In contrast to patent and copyright laws, the goal of 
trademark law is not to reward innovations of products or 
services,225 but rather, to facilitate efficiency.226 Ironically, 
however, the tax rules governing trademarks and trade names 
were not designed with these efficiency goals in mind. 
Capitalized trademark and trade name costs were not 
depreciable or amortizable at all prior to 1956, nor between 
1986 and 1993. During these periods, they could only be 
recovered upon the abandonment or sale of the mark or name, 
reflecting a government doubt that investment in trademark 
and trade names produced social benefits that market forces 
might adequately reflect.227 The capitalized costs of patents, 
however, have always been eligible for depreciation 
allowances.228 As another example, Congress enacted a special 
provision in 1969 mandating ordinary income treatment on 
contingent payments received in a trademark or trade name 
transfer, regardless of whether the transfer is, in substance, a 
  
 223  I.R.C. § 1235 (2006). 
 224 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 549 
(current version at I.R.C. § 170 (2006)) (targeting self-created copyrights but not self-
developed patents). In 2004, Congress amended the charitable deduction provision by 
eliminating the fair market value standard for contributions of most all forms of 
intellectual property, and reducing the initial amount a donor may deduct. American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882, 118 Stat. 1418, 1627 (codified as 
amended in I.R.C. §§ 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), 170(m), 6050L (2006)). 
 225 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 226 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 227 See S. REP. NO. 99-313 (1986) (Comm. Rep.). With the enactment of Section 
197 in 1993, capitalized trademark and trade name costs became amortizable ratably 
over a fifteen-year period. I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 228 An early Treasury regulation provided that if an acquired intangible asset 
could be shown to have a limited useful life, then the capitalized acquisition costs were 
recoverable over that asset’s useful lifetime. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 
2004). Under this rule, patents were eligible for depreciation due to the fact that they 
have limited useful lives (twenty years). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), (d). 
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sale or a license.229 For patent transfers, in contrast, the nature 
of the payments (contingent or noncontingent) is irrelevant in 
determining tax consequences.230 
An appropriate legal framework for tax legislation 
governing intellectual property rights should consider the 
extent to which the tax system is harmonious with the 
intellectual property goals identified above. Admittedly, 
maintaining harmony with intellectual property goals can be 
challenging in a rapidly changing technology and business 
environment. For instance, special tax incentives for innovative 
developments were enacted more than fifty years ago.231 Since 
then, there has been a major shift in the innovation market 
towards a segmentation model.232 Desirable transfers of 
innovation between both segments can be either supported or 
hindered by the income tax system. An appropriate framework 
might consider the commercial and business realities of 
innovation segmentation, and suggest that tax incentives 
encouraging greater research activity and supporting economic 
growth should not be limited to the innovation development 
market alone. The result might be more favorable tax rules 
governing assignments to private market acquirers and 
governing donations to research universities—rules that 
achieve optimal innovation outcomes and enhance economic 
growth. 
Another contemporary phenomenon has been the 
change in the use of patents in business strategy. In recent 
years, businesses have looked to patent acquisition for 
licensing purposes or offensive-use purposes (e.g., to threaten 
  
 229 I.R.C. § 1253(c) (2006). 
 230 Early on, the government and courts struggled with the issue of whether a 
patent assignment should be denied capital-gains treatment solely because the 
purchase price took the form of contingent payments. Some courts held that the receipt 
of contingent payments did not prevent a transfer from being considered a sale. See, 
e.g., Comm’r v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (consideration in 
the form of future royalties); Comm’r v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942) (same). 
Others held the receipt of contingent payments did preclude sale treatment. See, e.g., 
Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952) (consideration in the form of future 
royalties). In 1958, the Service issued an administrative pronouncement, ruling that 
patent transferors could enjoy “sale” treatment (and, hence, capital-gains treatment) 
even though consideration received is measured by production, use, or sale of the 
patented article. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408. 
 231 Sections 174 (deduction for limited research and experimental 
expenditures) and 1235 (safe harbor providing capital-gains treatment for limited 
assignments of patents) were enacted in 1954, while Section 41 (tax credit for limited 
research expenditures) was enacted much later in 1981. I.R.C. §§ 41, 174, 1235 (2006). 
 232 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
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other companies with litigation), as opposed to manufacturing 
purposes. An appropriate framework would consider the extent 
to which the tax system should support or discourage this 
paradigm shift. The current tax system treats all innovation 
acquisitions alike.233 But the innovation goals behind patent 
rights are tied to the strategic reasons for their acquisition. In 
particular, patent acquisition for offensive-use purposes 
frustrates innovation.234 To promote scientific progress and 
other innovation goals, then, perhaps the tax system should 
support the licensing model and not the offensive-use model. 
B. Establishing a Rational Basis for Coherent Tax 
Distinctions Among Intellectual Property Rights 
Inequities and administrative inefficiencies in the 
intellectual property tax system result largely from the 
modeling of tax distinctions on intellectual property law labels. 
In many cases, special tax rules governing intellectual property 
adopt an asset-specific approach, applying to one or more 
specific types of intellectual property and specifically defined 
for tax purposes. For example, Section 1235 of the Code applies 
only to transfers of patents as specifically defined for tax 
purposes;235 Section 1221(b)(3) applies only to transfers of 
copyrights in musical works;236 and Section 1253 applies to 
transfers of trademarks and trade names, each of which is 
specifically defined for tax purposes.237  
Some Code provisions make no tax distinctions among 
the different types of intellectual property. These provisions 
adopt a “grouping approach,” attempting to affect a larger 
  
 233  See supra note 195. 
 234 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 235 I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2006) (guaranteeing capital-gains treatment for any 
transfer of all substantial rights to a patent by a statutorily defined holder to an 
unrelated party); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980) (providing definition 
of patent for purposes of Section 1235). 
 236 I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2006) (providing that, at the election of a taxpayer, the 
Section 1221(a)(1) and (a)(3) exclusions from capital asset status do not apply to 
musical compositions or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer 
described in Section 1221(a)(3)). 
 237 Id. § 1253(a) (requiring ordinary income treatment on contingent payments 
received for the transfer of a trademark or trade name, and requiring ordinary income 
treatment on noncontingent payments received for the transfer of a trademark or trade 
name if the transferor retains any significant power, right, or continuing interest with 
respect to the subject matter of the mark or name). The terms trademark and trade 
name were broadly defined in regulations that were proposed in 1971, but eventually 
withdrawn due to a sunset provision. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-1 to -3, 36 Fed. Reg. 
13148 (July 15, 1971), withdrawn, 58 Fed. Reg. 25587 (Apr. 27, 1993). 
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group of intellectual property assets by listing the various 
types of intellectual property assets within the scope of the 
provisions. Section 170—which contains a special charitable 
tax deduction provision applicable to intellectual property—
takes a true “grouping” approach, applying to “any patent, 
copyright . . . , trademark, trade name, trade secret, know-how, 
software . . . , or similar property, or applications or 
registrations of such property.”238 Section 197—which imposes a 
mandatory fifteen-year amortization schedule for certain 
capitalized costs—does the same, applying to “any patent, 
copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, knowhow, format, 
or other similar item,” and “any trademark or trade name.”239 
Interestingly, these provisions adopting a grouping approach 
avoid using the broader term “intellectual property.”240  
1. Deciding Whether the Tax System Should Adopt Tax 
Distinctions 
Drafters of any tax legislation must consider the scope 
of the particular provision. Thus, a legal framework for 
intellectual property taxation should consider whether to adopt 
tax distinctions for intellectual property areas. A risk of 
adopting tax distinctions among different types of intellectual 
property is that the tax system may not be flexible enough to 
be applied to future innovations and changes in intellectual 
property. 
Internet domain names are a prime example of an 
intellectual property movement that has outstripped the 
present tax system. Under the current regime, specific tax 
rules do not exist for domain names, which are valuable assets 
that emerged with the arrival of global e-commerce 
transactions on the Internet.241 Are domain names merely 
variations of traditional forms of intellectual property and 
other intangible rights to which the existing tax regime can be 
applied? As the authors have previously argued, domain names 
that function as source identifiers might be treated under the 
  
 238 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 239 Id. §§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii), (d)(1)(F) (emphasis added). 
 240 The term “intellectual property” was first mentioned in Davoll v. Brown, 1 
Woodb. & M. 53, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). Peter S. Menell, Intellectual 
Property and the Property Rights Movement, 30 REGULATION 36, 37 (2007), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-6.pdf. 
 241  See, e.g., Domain Name Prices Rise Again, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 29, 
2003, at A02. 
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current tax rules applicable to trademarks, but generic domain 
names possess “inherent” goodwill unaddressed by the existing 
tax regime.242  
Another example of the administrative difficulties of an 
inflexible tax system with distinct rules for different types of 
intellectual property is what we identify as the “Coca-Cola” 
problem. In business practice today, many different types of 
intellectual property are often bundled together, as many forms 
of intellectual property protection are available for a particular 
product or service.243 This bundling phenomenon raises the 
question: How should a particular transaction involving 
bundled intellectual property assets be treated for tax purposes 
under an asset-specific tax regime that maintains distinct rules 
for different types of intellectual property? 
There are a “bundle” of intellectual property rights 
embodied inside and outside each Coca-Cola can or bottle. The 
trademark Coca-Cola was worth about $68.734 billion in 
2009.244 It is not any ordinary trademark; it is a brand with a 
large equity built through years of advertisements, 
distributions, and uses in commerce worldwide.245 Coca-Cola 
created goodwill in the trademark over the years that is 
attached and associated with that trademark.246 
  
 242 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual 
Property Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Nguyen & Maine, Taxing the 
New IP Right]. 
 243 Additionally, companies often bundle different types of intellectual 
property assets when they license in or out for the daily business operation. See 
generally Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1267, 1309-10 (2004) (observing the bundling of trademarks and other intellectual 
property assets in licensing practices); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, 
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002) 
(noting the integration and simultaneous use of patents and trademarks in business 
practice and calling for a new theory of intellectual property to address the integration 
of different types of intellectual property). 
 244 Best Global Brands 2009, INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/en/ 
best-global-brands/best-global-brands-2008/best-global-brands-2009.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2010). 
 245 Brand equity has been equated with the concept of goodwill, which has 
been defined as “that which makes tomorrow’s business more than an accident. It is 
the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past satisfactory dealings . . . 
[that] gives [the business] a selling value above that of its leasehold, equipment and 
stock.” EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914). 
 246 See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555-56 
(1993) (“Although the definition of goodwill has taken different forms over the years, 
the shorthand description of goodwill as ‘the expectancy of continued patronage,’ 
provides a useful label with which to identify the total of all the imponderable qualities 
that attract customers to the business.” (quoting Boe v. Comm’r, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th 
Cir. 1962)) (internal citation omitted)). 
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The Coke bottle has a unique shape that deserves trade 
dress protection.247 Indeed, courts have mentioned the Coke 
bottle as an example of trade dress worthy of legal protection.248 
Trade dress protection extends to the product’s packaging, and 
its overall look and feel that serve as a source identifier in the 
eyes of the consumer.249 Protected trade dress enjoys a similar 
protection available to trademarks under federal and state 
laws.250 The distinctive red and white design on the Coke tin 
can is easily recognizable today. The consumer walking down a 
beverage aisle has no difficulty distinguishing a pack of Coke 
cans from the others.251 This design is protected under 
trademark law.252  
  
 247 See Gary Myers, Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and 
Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress, 
and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241, 260 (2000) (“[N]ot 
only is the name Coca-Cola protectable, but so is the red-and-white swirl packaging of 
its producer’s cans and the distinctive shape of the old-fashioned Coke bottle.”). 
 248 E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (“[A] 
classic glass Coca Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for those 
consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may constitute the 
product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part of the product itself 
for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle, rather than a can, 
because they think it more stylish to drink from the former.”). 
 249 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (“It 
is well established that trade dress can be protected under federal law. The design or 
packaging of a product may acquire a distinctiveness which serves to identify the 
product with its manufacturer or source; and a design or package which acquires this 
secondary meaning, assuming other requisites are met, is a trade dress which may not 
be used in a manner likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of the goods.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775-76 (1992) 
(providing trade dress protection for the look and feel of a fast food restaurant); see also 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006) (“In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this 
chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts 
trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected 
is not functional.”). 
 250 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (stating 
that federal unfair competition law “broadly prohibits uses of trademarks, trade 
names, and trade dress that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product 
or service”), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209 (observing that the federal 
Lanham Act extends protections to “word marks, such as ‘Nike,’ and symbol marks, 
such as Nike’s ‘swoosh’ symbol, but also ‘trade dress’—a category that originally 
included only the packaging, or ‘dressing,’ of a product . . . [and] the design of a 
product”); see also Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc. v. Brand FX Body Co., No. 2-08-144-CV, 
2010 WL 1433404, at *7-8 (Tex. App. Apr. 8, 2010) (holding that Texas unfair 
competition law against misappropriation of non-functional trade dress design is not 
preempted by federal patent law and affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of the 
plaintiff on the state claim of unfair competition against misappropriation). 
 251 Dana M. Herberholz, Curing Confusion: An Overview of the Regulatory 
Complexities of Obtaining Pharmaceutical Trademarks and Prescription for Reform, 8 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 97, 100 (2007) (“The protections of trademark law enable the 
supermarket customer to choose to purchase COCA-COLA® to the exclusion of other 
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The Coke formula is a well-kept trade secret that 
ensures the success of the beverage.253 Others have tried to 
imitate the brown-colored drink but could not. Other brown 
drinks are sold under trademarks, such as Pepsi-Cola and Dr. 
Pepper, but none approaches the unique taste of Coke.254 There 
is no doubt that the trade secret of the Coke formula is very 
valuable.255  
A legal framework for intellectual property taxation 
should consider the most efficient manner to reflect the 
evolution of intellectual property rights and the realities of a 
changing economy. Consider a transaction involving the 
bundling of intellectual property rights embodied inside and 
outside each Coca-Cola can or bottle. A tax system that groups 
together various intellectual property rights for tax purposes 
might be more easily applied in practice than a system that 
adopts separate tax rules for separate transactions involving 
differing types of intellectual property. The grouping approach 
would avoid questions over whether the tax results should be 
dictated by focusing on the trademark Coca-Cola, on the trade 
dress of the Coke can, or on the trade secret of the Coke 
formula. When focused on all three of these rights as one 
unified asset, a grouping approach would also eliminate messy 
allocation and valuation issues.  
The current tax system adopts a grouping approach for 
many acquisitions of intellectual property (i.e., intellectual 
  
colas, knowing that the famous red label showcasing white letters refers to a particular 
and familiar brand of cola.”). 
 252 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1183 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (granting Coca-Cola’s motion to enjoin defendant from using Coca-
Cola’s red sign and white script to sell posters saying, “Enjoy Cocaine”). 
 253 See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 
286 (D. Del. 1985) (finding that the Coca-Cola formula is “one of the best-kept trade 
secrets in the world” and that it is kept locked away in an Atlanta bank vault which 
may “only be opened upon a resolution from the Company’s Board of Directors”). 
 254  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 
2008) (upholding conspiracy convictions for defendants who attempted to sell Coca-
Cola’s formula to Pepsi, noting the severity of harm that Coca-Cola could have suffered 
if defendants had been successful). 
 255 See id.; Coca-Cola Co. v. Reed Indus., Inc., 864 F.2d 150 (Table), 1988 WL 
124469, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court’s injunction against the 
defendants in a case brought by Coca-Cola for misappropriation of its Coke formulas); 
Xpel Techs. Corp. v. Am. Filter Film Distribs., No. SA-08-CA-175-XR, 2008 WL 
3540345, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2008) (“Take for example the formula for making 
Coca-Cola. This formula is a trade secret possessed by The Coca-Cola Company. If a 
competitor surreptitiously eavesdropped on an internal conversation in which Coke 
employees were discussing this formula, and if this competitor then started using the 
improperly acquired formula in the making of its products, Coca-Cola would justifiably 
be upset.”). 
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property acquired as part of the acquisition of assets 
constituting the acquisition of a trade or business). Section 197, 
which was enacted in 1993 to simplify tax depreciation rules 
for intangible property, adopts a single depreciation method—a 
straight-line method—and a single, fifteen-year recovery period 
for the capitalized costs of acquiring many forms of intellectual 
property.256 Thus, a purchaser of the bundle of intellectual 
property rights embodied in the Coca-Cola product (trademark, 
trade dress, and trade secret rights) would amortize the total 
purchase price ratably over fifteen years.  
In contrast to its treatment of intellectual property 
acquisitions, the tax regime does not adopt a grouping 
approach for the sale of intellectual property. Instead, the Code 
contains special tax rules for the assignment of trademarks,257 
and it relies on general tax rules for the assignment of trade 
secrets and trade dress rights.258 Thus, the seller of a bundle of 
intellectual property rights embodied in the Coca-Cola product 
would be required to allocate the sales price among the various 
intellectual property rights and apply different tax rules to 
each in order to determine the tax results.259 This would not be 
an easy task in light of the bundling of the various intellectual 
property rights.  
The bundling problem, as highlighted in the Coca-Cola 
example above, also arises in the context of billboards. Each 
billboard—advertising, for example, Nike products, Marlboro 
cigarettes, or Wrigley gum—is a copyrighted work of 
authorship.260 The creators express their ideas in a tangible 
medium that conveys a message embedded in the depiction. 
The author of a billboard may be a freelance artist or an 
  
 256 I.R.C. § 197 (2006). See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 166, at 147 
(explaining that Congress created Section 197 to streamline federal taxation of 
intangible assets). 
 257 I.R.C. § 1253 (2006). 
 258 Id. §§ 1221, 1222, 1231. 
 259 Gain from the sale of the trademark would be ordinary income if payments 
were contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the mark, or if payments 
were noncontingent and the transferor retained any significant power, right or 
continuing interest with respect to the subject matter of the mark. Id. § 1253(a)-(c). In 
contrast, gain from the sale of the trade secret most likely would be treated as capital 
gain under general capital-gains provisions. Id. §§ 1221, 1222, 1231. 
 260 See Kleier Adver., Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (involving copyright infringement brought by an advertising company 
against an automobile dealership and advertising agency for the allegedly infringing 
use of the copyrighted billboard).  
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employee of an advertising agency.261 The contractual 
agreements between the product company and the author set 
forth the identity of the copyright owner.262 The billboard and 
its associated costs contribute to the building of the recognition, 
reputation, and goodwill embodied in the trademark or trade 
dress of each featured product. This bundling of intellectual 
rights in billboards raises interesting questions. For instance, 
how should billboard development costs be treated for tax 
purposes? Should costs be viewed as copyright development 
costs? Should such costs be treated as part of the development 
of a trademark or trade dress? Or should costs be treated as 
general advertising expenditures? The tax results under the 
current system depend on the answers to these questions.263 A 
more efficient regime would produce similar results regardless. 
Another classic example of the bundling of rights is 
computer software. For instance, Microsoft Windows is a group 
of complex software programs covered by many copyrights.264 
Each time a newer version of the software is created, there is a 
potential new copyright.265 Additionally, certain functions for 
  
 261 Id. In Kleier Advertising, the author of the copyrighted billboard “Beat the 
Pants” advertisement program was an advertisement agency with many employees and 
the billboard program “has been a traffic-stopping success in forty geographical 
markets throughout the United States and Canada.” Id. 
 262 Id. (noting that if a company wants to use the “Beat the Pants” billboard 
ad, it must obtain a license from the advertisement agency). 
 263 Under the current intellectual property taxation regime, copyright 
development costs incurred by a corporation are not currently deductible, but must be 
capitalized. I.R.C. §§ 263(a), 263A(a)-(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(ii)-(iii), -4(d) 
(2004). The costs of building up the goodwill value in a trademark are generally treated as 
deductible advertising costs, see Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, but fees paid to the 
Trademark Office for trademark protection are not currently deductible, Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.263(a)-4(l), ex. 9(i) (2004). The actual costs of building the tangible property (the physical 
billboard itself), are not deductible but must be capitalized. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
 264 See Microsoft Corp. v. Liu, No. 1:06-CV-1352-JOF, 2007 WL 4125753, at *3 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2007) (listing the certificates of copyright registrations for some of 
Microsoft Windows software programs, including (1) TX 4-905-936 (“Office 2000 Pro”); 
(2) TX 4-905-950 (“Access 2000”); (3) TX 4-905-949 (“Excel 2000”); (4) TX 4-906-019 
(“Outlook 2000”); (5) TX 4-905-952 (“PowerPoint 2000”); (6) TX 4-905-951 (“Word 
2000”); (7) TX 4-905-937 (“Publisher 2000”); (8) TX 4-309-301 (“FrontPage 2000”); and 
(9) TX 4-899-117 (“PhotoDraw 2000”)). 
 265 See Dispatch Automation, Inc. v. Richards, 280 F.3d 1116, 1120 (7th Cir. 
2002) (noting that software developers do not register numerous versions of the 
software as new versions are continually being created) (“One might wonder why, if the 
code for RiMS 2000 is as different from the code for its predecessors as Dispatch 
Automation claims, neither Dispatch Automation nor Richards has registered it with 
the Copyright Office. Asked this question at his deposition, Richards answered that ‘if 
you tried to submit a copyright application every time there was a new version of the 
program you would spend all your time trying to continually recopyright the program 
since . . . the program changed literally hundreds of times that day.’”). 
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Windows software programs are covered by patents.266 
Moreover, there is proprietary information and know-how 
embodied in Windows that is protected by trade secret law.267 
The name “Windows” is a known trademark, identifying the 
products widely installed in most computers and used by 
millions.268 The four curving, colorful panels of the Windows 
logo are also entitled to protection under trademark law.269 An 
administratively efficient tax system would be equipped to 
address a transaction involving the complex network of 
software seen in Windows. 
Another example of the “Coca-Cola” bundling problem is 
video games. In 2008, the revenue for games and supporting 
systems, software, and accessories reached $21.33 billion,270 and 
the number has been projected to increase to $48.9 billion by 
2011.271 A recent study revealed that the video-game industry 
employed 32,000 people in thirty-four states, and in 2009, these 
employees received $2.9 billion in compensation.272 Another 
study reported that the video-game industry is growing faster 
than other industries and has surpassed the ailing music 
industry.273 The creators, publishers, and distributors of video 
games rely on the bundling of different types of intellectual 
property for the daily operation of their businesses. For 
  
 266 Benjamin J. Kormos, Giving Frankenstein a Soul: Imposing Patentee 
Obligations, 21 INTELL. PROP. J. 309, 341 (2009) (“As of 2007, Microsoft held more than 
6,000 software patents.”). 
 267 Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: 
Tales From a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 338 (2009) 
(observing that Microsoft and other software companies rely on trade secret protection 
afforded to software programs distributed in binary form).  
 268 Microsoft has brought legal actions for using its well-known Windows 
trademark. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL 
31499324 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2002). 
 269 See Microsoft Corp. v. Silver Star Micro, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1350-WSD, 2008 
WL 115006, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2008) (listing the various trademark registrations for 
Microsoft “flag” logos that were the subject of a successful trademark infringement case). 
 270 2008 US Video Game Sales Reached $21.33 Bln, IT FACTS (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://www.itfacts.biz/2008-us-video-game-sales-reached-2133-bln/12439. 
 271 Ralph Baer, Genesis: How the Home Video Games Industry Began, 
http://www.ralphbaer.com/how_video_games.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) 
(recounting the history of home video games); Georg Szalai, Video Game Industry 
Growth Still Strong: Study, REUTERS (June 21, 2007, 4:41 AM), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/idUSN2132172920070623. 
 272 STEPHEN E. SICNEK, ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, VIDEO GAMES IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1 (2010), available at http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/VideoGames21stCentury_ 
2010.pdf. 
 273 Szalai, supra note 271 (“The video game sector will remain one of the 
above-average growth segments of the global entertainment industries through 2011, 
with global games spending set to exceed music spending this year.”). 
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example, game companies seek patent procurements for new 
game functions and initiate infringement litigation against 
other game companies for violations involving patent-related 
video games.274 Likewise, game companies utilize trademark 
law to protect the goodwill accumulated in video-game names 
and to enforce the trademarks against unauthorized use of 
similar or identical games that are likely to cause consumer 
confusion.275 In addition, game companies may rely on trade 
dress law to protect the look and feel of their game displays.276 
Most often, companies rely on copyright law for the protection 
of their games and prohibition of infringements.277 In reality, 
video games are all about software; indeed, the industry terms 
these games “entertainment software.”278  
These four bundling examples in the beverage, 
advertising, software, and game industries are reminders that 
companies today rely on many different types of intellectual 
property. These examples are not the exception; they are the 
norm. For example, in the biotech or biopharma industry, drug 
companies rely on patents279 and trade secrets for the protection 
of their research, development, and invention of certain 
  
 274 See, e.g., Hochstein v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-73071, 2008 WL 4387594 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2008) (involving a video-game patent titled “Apparatus and 
Method for Electrically Connecting Remotely Located Video Games,” U.S. Patent No. 
5,292,125); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (noting that the U.S. Patent No. 4,026,555 (the 555 patent) is “a patent that 
involves the earliest video games”). 
 275 E.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Brown, 94 F.3d 652 (Table), 1996 WL 468590, 
at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The record supports the district court’s determination that 
consumer confusion would occur about the origin of the video games at issue because 
they were virtually identical to the games sold by Nintendo.”); see also Sony Computer 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (trademark dilution claim 
in a case involving console video games). 
 276 See, e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (copyright claims in the video game instructions and display, trade dress 
infringement claims). 
 277 See, e.g., Wakefield v. Walt Disney Co., 321 F. App’x 685 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(copyright protection and infringement claims of Kingdom Hearts video games), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 752 (2009); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, L.L.C., 214 
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (action alleging that developer’s use of “screen shots” from 
manufacturer’s games in developer’s advertising violated manufacturer’s copyright); 
Nintendo, 94 F.3d 652 (Table), 1996 WL 468590 (affirming copyright and trademark 
infringement claims because defendant’s games were identical to plaintiff’s games); 
Frybarger v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing copyright 
infringement claim between two video games).  
 278 See Economic Data, ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, http://www.theesa.com/facts/ 
econdata.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 279 See generally Pharmaceutical Patents, INNOVATION.ORG, http://www. 
innovation.org/documents/File/Pharmaceutical_Patents.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).  
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drugs.280 Drug companies also rely on copyrights, trade dress, 
and trademarks in their advertising campaigns. To market and 
sell their drugs, for instance, drug companies use trademarks 
along with pamphlets and instructions.  
As these examples illustrate, the rigidity of the current 
intellectual property taxation scheme renders it incongruent 
with the realities of the current intellectual property system. 
Specifically, it is difficult to analyze the tax results of domain 
names and other Internet-based intangibles, as well as the tax 
results of transactions involving integrated intellectual 
property. Thus, an appropriate legal framework for intellectual 
property tax rules should ensure adequate flexibility in rules to 
deal with the evolution of intellectual property and the reality 
of the changing economy. A tax system flexible enough to 
account for new intangible rights and emerging intellectual 
property trends, such as the integration and simultaneous use 
of intellectual property, would achieve clearer tax results as 
well as administrative efficiency.  
2. Determining a Basis for Tax Distinctions 
If the tax system adopts distinctions for different types 
of intellectual property rights, then, to minimize inequities, a 
legal framework for tax rules should question whether 
substantive differences among forms of intellectual property 
justify different tax results for each form. While all types of 
intellectual property share certain common characteristics, 
there are substantive differences among the forms. A patent is 
issued for 20 years, and a copyright is in force for the life of the 
author plus 70 years (or 95 years, or in the case of a hired 
creator, 120 years).281 The protection for trademarks or trade 
names, by contrast, continues for as long as they are used in 
commerce.282 To what extent, if any, should these and other 
substantive differences justify different tax results? Under 
present rules, the receipt of contingent payments in patent and 
copyright transfers is treated vastly differently from the receipt 
  
 280 See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Antidepressant Makers Withhold Data on 
Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A1. 
 281 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.  
 282 A trademark right is based on use. Abandonment of a trademark occurs when 
the owner stops using the trademark in commerce. Federal trademark law presumes 
abandonment after three years of non-use of the trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
Abandonment of a trademark could occur if the owner failed to police the trademark so that 
it becomes the generic name for the product or service with which it is used. Id. 
60 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
of contingent payments in trademark and trade name 
transfers.283 One commentator has argued that the only major 
substantive difference among these forms—duration—does not 
justify differing effects in contingent payments.284 But perhaps 
there are other substantive differences supporting differing tax 
results; for example, patents and copyrights further innovation 
goals, whereas trademarks further efficiency goals. An 
appropriate legal framework would focus attention on this 
issue and yield fewer perceived tax inequities.  
If tax distinctions are deemed justified based on 
substantive differences among intellectual property forms, a 
framework should question whether the different types of 
intellectual property are treated in an appropriate manner vis-
à-vis one another. Assume, for example, that patents and 
copyrights should be treated as equals for tax purposes due to 
their substantive similarities (because both serve to promote 
science and the arts)285 and that, conversely, trademarks should 
be treated differently for tax purposes (because they serve the 
different purpose of protecting consumers and trademark 
owners).286 A legal framework for analyzing intellectual 
property tax rules would question whether the treatment of 
patents and copyrights as one group, and trademarks as 
another, is an appropriate method of achieving true equity. 
As an alternative to focusing on the legal attributes of 
intellectual property and basing tax distinctions upon their 
substantive differences, a tax framework might base tax 
distinctions on the purposes that intellectual property assets 
serve. For example, instead of developing separate rules for 
identified intangibles (such as patents, trade secrets, 
copyrights, trademarks, trade names, and computer software), 
creating legal definitions, and carving out exceptions, a tax 
system could develop separate rules for “technology-based 
intangible assets,” “marketing-based intangible assets,” and 
“artistic-based intangible assets.”287  
  
 283 See supra notes 93, 229-30 and accompanying text. 
 284 See Daniel A. Izzo, Contingent Payment Transfers of Trademarks: A Sale in 
License Clothing, 12 VA. TAX REV. 263, 275-76 (1992). 
 285 See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.  
 286 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.  
 287 With respect to accounting for business combinations, this is the approach 
that was adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). See FASB, 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (BUSINESS COMBINATIONS) 
app. F (2007). Technology-based intangibles include, for example, patents, unpatented 
technology, software, trade secrets, etc. Marketing-based intangibles include 
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Basing tax distinctions upon intellectual property uses, 
as opposed to intellectual property definitions, might yield a 
more flexible tax system capable of handling future innovations 
and intellectual property movements. As noted above, special 
tax rules governing intellectual property do not currently 
address domain names.288 It is arguable that domain names 
functioning as trademarks be treated as trademarks under 
current tax rules.289 But under this framework, they might fall 
within the category of “technology-based intangible assets” and 
thus might be treated like the other intangible assets in that 
category, such as patented and unpatented technology, trade 
secrets, etc. As with domain names, current tax rules do not 
specifically deal with websites.290 Instead of treating the various 
components of a website differently based on current tax 
treatment of software, copyrightable content, and non-
copyrightable content, the proposed framework might treat the 
website as a whole as a “marketing-related intangible asset.” 
Such an approach might also eliminate problems caused by the 
bundling of intellectual property in business practice.  
A tax system emphasizing intellectual property uses, as 
opposed to legal attributes, might yield more rational tax 
distinctions. Currently, for example, trademark and trade 
secret acquisition costs are treated the same for tax purposes.291 
However, it might be justifiable to treat a trade secret used as 
a technology-based intangible asset differently from a 
trademark used as a marketing based intangible asset. 
Likewise, it might be justifiable to treat a copyright that is 
classified as an artistic-related intangible (e.g., a book, play, or 
musical work) differently from a copyright that classified as a 
marketing-related intangible asset (e.g., advertising materials). 
  
trademarks, service marks, trade names, brand names, Internet domain names, etc. 
Artistic-based intangibles include literary works and copyrights, musical works, 
photography, maps, etc.; see also FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 142 (GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS) (2008). 
 288 See generally Nguyen & Maine, Taxing the New IP Right, supra note 242. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Under the current tax rules, taxpayers and advisors are left with 
questions, such as: Should the costs relating to the development of a website be treated 
the same as software development costs? How should the costs of creating or 
purchasing content for websites be treated? Does it make a difference if some website 
content is copyrightable or non-copyrightable? If websites are considered variations of 
existing intellectual or intangible property rights to which the existing tax law can be 
adopted, then the tax treatment of websites might depend on the website’s components 
(e.g., software, copyrightable content, non-copyrightable content). This approach is not 
easily applied in practice. 
 291  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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This approach would ensure consistency because a copyright on 
a book (an artistic-related intangible) would necessarily be 
treated in the same way as a copyright on a musical work (also 
an artistic-related intangible). Current law does not treat these 
copyrights similarly.292  
A system focusing on intellectual property uses would 
also eliminate the debate over whether emphasis should be on 
protections available or protections actually obtained. Certain 
property—such as computer software—is eligible for more than 
one type of intellectual property protection.293 This circumstance 
raises the question of whether tax consequences should be 
affected by the protections available (e.g., patent, copyright, 
trade secret), or whether tax consequences should depend on 
the actual protections obtained. Consider the tax treatment of 
an assignment of computer software or a design patent. Under 
current tax rules, a capital asset does not include any copyright 
in the hands of the person who created it.294 An interesting 
question that arises is whether this copyright exclusion applies 
when property, such as a design patent or computer software, 
is both patentable and copyrightable. Under current rules, the 
copyright exclusion does not apply if “a patent or an invention, 
or a design . . . may be protected only under the patent law and 
not under the copyrightable law.”295 As a result, design patents, 
which are “eligible for both patent and copyright protection,” 
are subject to the copyright exclusion. Likewise, computer 
software, which is copyrightable but often protected through a 
trade secret agreement, is also subject to the copyright 
  
 292  See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
 293  Copyright law has traditionally served as the source of legal protection for 
computer programs. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 
875 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established 
after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act . . . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
In addition to copyright law, patent protection has been extended to computer software 
inventions which are also known as Internet patents or business method patents. See 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding that business method inventions are 
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the patent statute). In addition to 
copyright and patent law, trade secret has been extended to protect computer 
programs. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., No. 08-10521, 2010 
WL 3769210, at *8 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court’s permanent injunction 
against the defendant for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation of 
the plaintiff’s software). 
 294 I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(3)(A), 1231(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
 295 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1980). 
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exclusion.296 Basing tax distinctions on intellectual property 
uses would eliminate this outcome.297 
CONCLUSION 
Federal tax rules governing intellectual property 
evolved in the absence of an appropriate legal framework for 
the intersection of intellectual property and taxation schemes. 
As a result, the current intellectual property tax regime is 
flawed on several grounds. Utilizing horizontal equity as a tax 
policy analysis tool uncovers numerous differences in the tax 
treatment of similar intellectual property owners, assets, and 
transactions. Utilizing an appropriate efficiency standard to 
evaluate tax subsidies for intellectual property (e.g., tax 
expenditures in the form of deductions and credits) reveals that 
many of the tax expenditures for intellectual property are 
circumscribed to have limited effectiveness. Although some 
aspects of the current tax scheme complement and promote the 
intellectual property scheme, others hinder it and stifle 
desirable intellectual property activity. Furthermore, 
distinctions in the current tax system—different rules for 
different types of intellectual property—have produced an 
inflexible scheme not easily applied to evolving intellectual 
property rights and practices, particularly transactions 
involving integrated intellectual property.  
A rational, coherent legal framework is needed for the 
development of an intellectual property tax system that does 
not violate fundamental equity and efficiency principles of tax 
policy. In developing an appropriate framework for intellectual 
property tax rules, the following questions should be asked: 
First, should the taxation and intellectual property schemes be 
harmonious (i.e., should the tax system be designed to support 
the intellectual property system)? Second, if tax distinctions 
among intellectual property are to be adopted, what is the basis 
for making them? 
  
 296 For criticism of the current approach, see CHARLES EDWARD FALK, TAX 
PLANNING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND LICENSING OF COPYRIGHTS, COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE, TRADEMARKS AND FRANCHISES, A-26 to -27 (1997). 
 297 Interestingly, while the tax treatment of assignments of software and 
design patents is impacted by intellectual property protections, the tax treatment of 
developments and acquisitions of software and design patents is not. Costs of software 
development, for example, are generally treated the same (deductible) regardless of the 
method of protection available or obtained. See Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601. A 
legal framework emphasizing intellectual property uses would avoid such a distinction 
in the current tax system. 
